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ARTICLES
Some Realism about Punishment Naturalism
Donald Braman,† Dan M. Kahan,†† & David A. Hoffman‡
In this Article, we critique the increasingly prominent claims of Punishment Naturalism—the notion that highly nuanced intuitions about most forms of crime and punishment are broadly shared, and that this agreement is best explained by a particular
form of evolutionary psychology. While the core claims of Punishment Naturalism are
deeply attractive and intuitive, they are contradicted by a broad array of studies and
depend on a number of logical missteps. The most obvious shortcoming of Punishment
Naturalism is that it ignores empirical research demonstrating deep disagreements over
what constitutes a wrongful act and just how wrongful a given act should be deemed to
be. But an equally serious shortcoming of Punishment Naturalism is that it fails to provide a credible account of the social and cognitive mechanisms by which individuals
evaluate both crime and punishment, opting instead for explanations that are either
specific and demonstrably wrong or so vague as to be untestable.
By way of contrast, we describe an alternative approach, Punishment Realism, that
develops the core insights of legal realism via psychology and anthropology. Punishment
Realism, we argue, offers a more complete account of agreement and disagreement over
the criminal law and provides a more detailed and credible account of the social and cognitive mechanisms that move people to either agree or disagree with one another on
whether a given act should be praised or punished and how much praise or punishment it
deserves. The differences between these two empirical accounts also suggest contrasting
implications for how those interested in maximizing social welfare and public satisfaction
with the law should approach questions of crime and punishment.
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The sure fatality is to imagine variance not there or wait for it to go
away.
1
–Clifford Geertz

INTRODUCTION
You are at the bus station, bringing the rings to your best friend’s
wedding, when your wallet and ticket are stolen. No one will lend you
money to pay the fare. You notice a well-heeled fellow traveler heading
to the restroom, leaving jacket and ticket behind. You think about it. He
could afford another ticket. There’s no chance you’d be caught. But in
the end you can’t bring yourself to do it. As painful as it will be to miss
the wedding, you just know that stealing the ticket would be wrong.
But how do you know that? How do any of us know right from
wrong? Is our morality by and large determinate and innate, the product of evolutionary forces acting over millions of years, or do we acquire
it within our lifetimes, reading acts in relation to variable social norms
that we have assimilated from those around us? How we answer these
questions matters. If humans share highly specific intuitions about justice as a consequence of innate moral mechanisms, then it will be quite
difficult, perhaps even impossible, to alter those intuitions, and we
should be very cautious if we plan to adopt an approach to punishment
that deviates from these innate preferences. If, on the other hand, we
develop a sense of morality over our lifetimes in relation to varied social norms, then we might learn how our moral intuitions are shaped
and develop means of fostering conceptions of justice that are both satisfying to us and compatible with our collective welfare.
This Article argues that although moral judgments depend on
numerous cognitive and physiological mechanisms that are presumably the product of evolutionary pressures, they are not innate insofar
as they depend crucially on social meaning that varies across cultural
groups. In our opening hypothetical, you (or, rather, our hypothetical
version of you) refused to steal the ticket. But not everyone would, as
evidenced not only by the hypothetical (though perhaps familiar)
theft of your wallet, but also by extensive empirical research that we
describe below.
In developing this account, this Article critiques the increasingly
prominent claims of Punishment Naturalism—the notion that highly
nuanced intuitions about most forms of crime and punishment are

1
Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology 219
(Basic Books 1983).
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2

broadly shared because they are innate. To their credit, Punishment
Naturalists marshal an impressive array of empirical research into
widely shared human intuitions. Many humans do share broad intuitions that provide them with nearly effortless appraisals of wrongdoing. But if the core claims of Punishment Naturalism are deeply
attractive and intuitive, they are not unassailable. There are extensive
data showing dissensus over punishment for which naturalism cannot
account. There is also a troubling void in naturalism where one would
expect a credible account of either the social or cognitive mechanisms
by which individuals evaluate crime and punishment.
A fuller and more accurate explanation of human intuitions
3
about wrongdoing is offered by what we call Punishment Realism.
Uniting the insights of legal realists with research conducted by anthropologists, social psychologists, and evolutionary biologists, Punishment Realism is based on the premise that while individuals do hold
deep and abiding intuitions regarding wrongdoing and responses to it,
these intuitions depend on social constructs that are demonstrably
plastic. Thus, while there are a number of important (perhaps even
universal) features of human cognition that shape our understandings
of wrongdoing, they are features that interact with, and enable the
construction of, varied social norms rather than produce them in a
determinate manner.
How varied are our norms? If you thought you should refrain
from taking the ticket because it was wrong, then you agree with most
Americans. On a naturalist account, this makes sense: the “taking of
property without consent” is a moral violation, part of the “core of
4
wrongdoing” —something on which nearly all humans normally agree.
2
Although this Article is limited to the specific application of naturalism to punishment
theory, Punishment Naturalism partakes of a broader trend toward legal analyses drawing on
research in the area of evolutionary psychology, much of which avoids the pitfalls we describe
herein. See, for example, Owen D. Jones and Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A
New Theory of the Endowment Effect, 49 Wm & Mary L Rev 1935, 1953–54 (2008); Rose
McDermott, James H. Fowler, and Oleg Smirnov, On the Evolutionary Origin of Prospect Theory
Preferences, 70 J Polit 335, 337–38 (2008); Herbert Gintis, The Evolution of Private Property, 64 J
Econ Behav & Org 1, 2–3 (2007); Jeffrey E. Stake, The Property “Instinct,” 359 Phil Transactions
Royal Socy B: Bio Sci 1763, 1767 (2004); Paul H. Rubin, Darwinian Politics: The Evolutionary
Origin of Freedom 173 (Rutgers 2002). The naturalism that we describe here is distinct from, and
should not be confused with, the philosophical use of the term. See, for example, Keith Campbell,
Naturalism, in Donald M. Borchert, ed, 6 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 492, 492 (Thomson 2d ed
2006) (defining naturalism in the philosophical context as representing the proposition that “the
natural world is the only real one, and that the human race is not separate from it, but belongs to
it as a part”).
3
See generally Donald Braman and Dan M. Kahan, Legal Realism as Psychological and
Cultural (Not Political) Realism, in Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha Merrill Umphrey, eds, How Law Knows 93, 112–13 (Stanford 2007).
4
For further discussion of these terms, see note 35 and accompanying text.
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And no one can blame you for missing the wedding—after all, you
have a reasonable excuse for missing it. But researchers who posed
the same question in India found that the vast majority of participants
5
there thought that you would be justified in taking the ticket. Where
American subjects tended to justify missing the wedding in moral
terms that centered on individualized justice and personal property,
Indian participants tended to justify the theft in moral terms that emphasized the social and relational responsibilities of friends, particularly at such an important event. When researchers asked tribal leaders
in Papua New Guinea how they would resolve a similar scenario, the
leaders not only thought that stealing would be justified, but blamed
the people who failed to be of assistance: “If nobody helped him and
he did that I wouldn’t charge him for that because I would say we had
6
caused that problem.” These broad cultural differences reflect variations in underlying norms regarding property, mutual responsibility,
and accountability—norms that fundamentally shape the way we evaluate the wrongfulness of specific acts.
Before we turn to the details of this critique, we feel it is vital to
disclose our motivations for undertaking it. We apprehend the world
of criminal law from the intertwined vantage points of scholars, teachers, and interested citizens. What we see fills us simultaneously with
wonder and fear, hope and anxiety.
To us, the most conspicuous feature of the criminal law landscape
is political conflict. We observe persistent and intense disagreement on
a wide variety of issues, many going to the core of the State’s twin obligations to protect its citizens from harm and to respect their freedom. When a man kills an attacker in a public space despite the op7
portunity to flee, is that murder or a justified exercise of self-defense?
How about when a woman kills a sleeping husband who for years has
8
subjected her to physical torment and emotional degradation? If a
5
See Joan G. Miller and David M. Bersoff, Culture and Moral Judgment, 62 J Personality
& Soc Psych 541, 547 (1992) (reporting that 45 percent of American adults and 85 percent of
Indian adults thought taking the ticket was appropriate, and that 43 percent of American third
graders and 98 percent of Indian third graders thought that taking the ticket was appropriate).
6
Anne M. Tietjen and Lawrence J. Walker, Moral Reasoning and Leadership among Men
in a Papua New Guinea Society, 21 Develop Psych 982, 989 (1985) (characterizing the tribe’s
conception of morality as emphasizing “community harmony”).
7
See Patrik Jonsson, Is Self-Defense Law Vigilante Justice?, Christian Sci Monitor (Feb 24,
2006), online at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0224/p02s01-usju.html (visited May 1, 2010)
(reporting on the national controversy over a newly enacted spate of “stand your ground” laws
that permit the use of deadly force despite the possibility of retreat). See also Dan M. Kahan and
Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 Colum L Rev 269, 329–32
(1996) (describing the historical underpinnings of the dispute in competing cultural styles).
8
See Kahan and Nussbaum, 96 Colum L Rev at 332–33 (cited in note 7) (comparing how
jurisdictions treat this issue to how they treat duty to flee under self-defense doctrine).
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man has sex with a woman who repeatedly says “no,” should he be
9
deemed a rapist—or even punished at all? Should a man who “loses
control” and kills his wife for having sex with another man be treated
10
as less culpable than a premeditated murderer? How about a man
11
who kills another man for soliciting sex from him? Should people be
12
sent to jail for using recreational drugs? Is a corporation’s decision to
promote its stock with boastful speech about its balance sheet a form
of criminal fraud, or merely puffery that is protected by both the
common law and the First Amendment? To us, disputes over issues
like these attest to the remarkable heterogeneity of cultural values
within our society.
The diversity of positions political communities have adopted on
such issues—over place and over time—makes us conscious of the
plasticity of social norms and of the resulting urgency of using law to
promote morally defensible norms. At the same time, our recognition
of the unavoidable connection between the law’s position in such conflicts and the status of contested visions of the good life makes us anxious when assessing the proper scope for norm shaping in a liberal
society and intent on discovering means for avoiding cultural domination and accommodating difference.
This is decidedly not the picture of the criminal-law world painted
by Punishment Naturalists. They perceive not conflict but consensus,
not cultural heterogeneity but biological uniformity. As they read the
evidence (generated by their studies and those of others), “human
intuitions of justice about core wrongdoing . . . are deep, predictable,
13
and widely shared,” the product of “evolved predisposition” and of
“social learning arising only from an aspect of human life experience
. . . so fundamental as to be essentially universal to all persons without
14
regard to circumstances or culture.”
9
See generally Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Harvard 1987) (discussing the controversy over
this issue).
10 See Kahan and Nussbaum, 96 Colum L Rev at 346–47 (cited in note 7) (noting contested
and changing attitudes on this issue).
11 See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv L Rev 413, 465–67
(1999) (describing the political conflict over whether such offenses should be graded as the
aggravated “hate crime” form of murder or instead mitigated to voluntary manslaughter).
12 See John Hoeffel, Bid to Legalize Pot Advances: Initiative Backers Gather What Is Likely
to Be Enough Signatures to Put Their Measure on the California Ballot in November, LA Times
A14 (Jan 29, 2010). Consider also Gary Fields, Shorter Sentences Sought for Crack: Administration Tells Congress It Favors Ending Disparity with Powder Cocaine, Wall St J A3 (Apr 30, 2009)
(detailing proposals by the Obama administration to eliminate the sentencing disparity between
crack and powder cocaine offenses).
13 Paul H. Robinson and Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 Minn L Rev 1829, 1892 (2007).
14 Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban, and Owen D. Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions
of Justice, 60 Vand L Rev 1633, 1646, 1687 (2007).
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Where we see mutability in norms, and hence the inescapability of
collective responsibility for their content, the naturalists apprehend
their stability and warn of the futility and even perversity of using criminal law as an instrument of norm reform. “[T]he universal and intuitive
nature of core judgments about justice” cautions against being “optimistic that arguments or education necessarily will produce . . . change[s] in
15
judgments about justice.” And “trying to alter people’s intuitions of
justice” through law reform—or as the naturalists put it, “criminal law
manipulation” by “social engineers” aimed at “get[ting] people to view
16
conduct . . . as condemnable or more condemnable” —must be viewed
with deep suspicion: “[A] criminal justice system that regularly fails to
do justice or that regularly does injustice, as judged by shared intuitions
of justice . . . will inevitably be seen as failing in a mission” that the
17
community thinks important, thereby vitiating its “moral credibility”
and fomenting “generalized contempt for the system in all its aspects,
18
and a generalized suspicion of all of its rules.” The dilemma of how to
manage the norm-shaping potential of law in a liberal society is thus
dispelled by the proclaimed nonexistence of meaningful cultural conflict combined with the prudential necessity of respecting genetically
programmed moral instincts.
But the tangled complex of hopes and fears we experience when
we survey criminal law is not vanquished by Punishment Naturalism.
We think it is important to advise others who share our sensibilities that
there is nothing in Punishment Naturalism to make them feel better (or
worse). As far as we can tell, there is not a single position of any consequence on any of the contested issues we have already adverted (or on
many like ones) that is ruled out or in by Punishment Naturalism.
The Punishment Naturalists might well demur; their target, they
19
might claim, consists of marginal “academics or policy wonks” who
believe that law should be structured on the basis of a utilitarian calculus that excludes public sensibilities altogether, or that the institution of criminal law or the practice of “punishment” should simply be
abolished.20 (Ironically, the most serious purveyors of these positions are
a pair of Antipunishment Naturalists who draw exactly the opposite

15 Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal
Law and Justice Policy, 81 S Cal L Rev 1, 51–52 (2007).
16 Id at 52.
17 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1688 (cited in note 14).
18 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 24 (cited in note 15). See also id at 23.
19 Id at 54.
20 See Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1688 (cited in note 14).
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conclusion from the materials upon which the Punishment Naturalists
21
themselves rely. )
But their sweeping language, as well as some of their own examples of suspect “[norm-]reform programs”—ones aimed at “eradicat[ing] the notion that women often pretend to withhold consent to
intercourse to appear more alluring,” at “rais[ing] the general level of
societal condemnation of the [domestic] abuser,” and at “build[ing]
public acceptance of both same-sex intercourse and the legal recogni22
tion of same-sex unions,” for example —invite a more expansive understanding of the significance of their work. As one thoughtful commentator reviewing Punishment Naturalist writings recently concluded:
Whatever theorists may think people should feel as a normative
matter, as an empirical matter, members of the public share surprisingly fixed notions of justice in traditional crimes—and especially the kinds of crimes discussed in a criminal law course. . . .
From the standpoint of law reform, then, reformers likely need to
accept these shared intuitions as settled. And from the standpoint
of teaching criminal law, I would add, professors need to recognize that there are relatively fixed and surprisingly hard-wired
judgments widely shared in society that help to generate the legal
23
rules found in criminal law codes and casebooks.
Accordingly, in this Article, we address Punishment Naturalists’
arguments on the assumption that they are intended to have implications for the pressing and conspicuous issues that are the everyday
focus of mainstream criminal law scholars and of ordinary citizens
interested in criminal law. And we show why it would be a mistake for
anyone to accept that what they have to say counsels against arguing
for reform of existing law.
In what follows, we argue that variations in cultural norms pervade evaluations of wrongdoing, even within what the Punishment
Naturalists describe as the “core of wrongdoing.” We explore these
issues in four Parts. We begin by making the strongest case we can for
Punishment Naturalism—and that case is tantalizing. It gets many
things right and taps into deep intuitions that many individuals have
about justice and the law. So while naturalism is significantly—even

21 See generally Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes
Nothing and Everything, 359 Phil Transactions Royal Socy B: Bio Sci 1775 (2004) (arguing that
advances in neuroscience will create a shift in people’s intuitions regarding free will and responsibility, resulting in a turn toward consequentialist punishment models).
22 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 52–53 (cited in note 15).
23 Orin Kerr, The Intuition of Retribution (Feb 17, 2010), online at http://crim.jotwell.com/
the-intuition-of-retribution (visited May 1, 2010).
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fundamentally—flawed, to understand why it is also deeply attractive
and surprisingly persistent, it is important to acknowledge what it gets
right and, perhaps more importantly, what it gets nearly right.
After laying out the naturalist claims, we then describe some of the
problems that emerge from an examination of the available data. A
host of studies in the fields that naturalists cite cannot bear the weight
that naturalists place on them. For the most part, naturalists make the
same kinds of mistakes that those making grand claims about universal
human nature have long made: they fail to see the significance of the
diversity that exists—diversity present not only in many of the studies
they cite, but even in studies they themselves conduct.
We then describe Punishment Realism, an alternative approach
that accounts for more of the available data and, we think, offers more
practical purchase. Using cross-cultural examples and statistical analyses, we present a series of cases for which realism offers more detailed and parsimonious explanations than naturalism in two ways.
First, rather than ignoring or downplaying diversity of intuition about
wrongdoing, realism suggests that, to the extent that people value persons, objects, and practices differently, they also evaluate injuries to
and interferences with them differently. Second, rather than positing
24
an untestable “moral organ,” Punishment Realism explains evaluations of wrongdoing with reference to well-established features of
human cognition that are open to empirical evaluation.
Finally, we make a pragmatic pitch for the comparative advantage
that Punishment Realism offers in the face of social dissensus. Where
Punishment Naturalism suggests that attempting to educate individuals away from their instinctual intuitions regarding wrongdoing will be
either fruitless or exceedingly difficult, Punishment Realism points
reformers toward the cognitive and social mechanisms of norm formation. Conflict and dissensus based on differing worldviews will always
be hard to resolve, but getting the source of the disagreement right, we
think, is a step in the right direction.
I. NATURALISM AND WRONGDOING
Punishment Naturalism, which holds that our sense of right and
wrong is largely innate, rests on observations of broadly shared sentiments about justice. Generally speaking, when someone commits a
wrong—murder, rape, theft, or fraud, say—we share an intuitive sense
that the wrongdoer should be punished. Moreover, we are likely to
agree that some crimes are far worse than others: all other things

24

For a description of the use of the term “moral organ,” see note 28 and accompanying text.
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equal, a drawn-out, brutal, and deliberate rape-homicide seems worse
than a quick and impulsive homicide. And just as we can distinguish
between types of killings quickly and easily, so too can we distinguish
among more and less serious forms of aggression from murder to rape
to assault to battery, and the same can be said of theft and fraud: within each extremely general category, we can distinguish more serious
from less serious cases.
As Punishment Naturalists note, this highly nuanced set of distinctions seems to come effortlessly. Where, Punishment Naturalists
ask, do those intuitions come from? And why are they so widely
shared? Surely, they answer, it is natural to feel the way we do about
25
crime and punishment. A specialized cognitive module devoted to
moral evaluations, naturalists argue, would explain both the extent of
our shared intuitions and the ease with which we arrive at moral
judgments. Marc Hauser, a professor of psychology at Harvard, captures the idea in his book, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our
Universal Sense of Right and Wrong, writing that humans have
“evolved a moral instinct, a capacity that naturally grows within each
child, designed to generate rapid judgments about what is morally
26
right or wrong based on an unconscious grammar of action.”
Naturalists deploy a series of analogies to bring this point home.
Marc Hauser, John Mikhail, and others, extending Noam Chomsky’s
famous (and famously controversial) analogy of linguistic cognition to
27
the functioning of bodily organs, posit a “moral organ” or “module”
in the mind that provides every normal human with a universal
“grammar of action,” a generic moral code that underlies the apparent

25 While naturalism might seem like a more modest restatement of natural law, it is distinct
in a number of ways. First and foremost, Punishment Naturalism makes no claims that these
broadly shared sentiments are anything like a law. Nor does it claim that human intuitions are
deontologically fair or materially useful; indeed, naturalists acknowledge that intuitions about
the law may be unfair or counterproductive. On this account there is nothing “natural” about
justice itself, there is only something “natural” about our intuitions about justice. Another way of
saying this is that whereas the ambition of a theory of natural law is primarily normative, the
ambition of Punishment Naturalism is primarily positive. Punishment Naturalists might derive
practical implications from their research, but their goal is to tell us how humans actually do
think, not how they should think, about crime and punishment. Punishment Naturalism thus
dispenses with the philosophical debates of traditional legal theory by making claims that can be
tested empirically and evaluated in terms of their practical value to policymakers and ordinary
citizens. See Paul H. Robinson, Empirical Desert, in Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey, and
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, eds, Criminal Law Conversations 29, 38 (Oxford 2009).
26 Marc Hauser, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and
Wrong xvii (HarperCollins 2006).
27 See Noam Chomsky, Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use 12–13 (Praeger
1986). See also Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Structures (Mouton 1975).
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28

diversity of values and practices in the world. Paul Robinson, Robert
Kurzban, and Owen Jones have similarly argued that “intuitions about
morality and justice seem to develop” in “the same way that baby
29
teeth grow from gums and adult teeth replace baby teeth.” There is,
on this account, a sense of right and wrong that, while non-obvious, is
ever present, governing our evaluations of one another in ways that
are surprisingly consistent.
Moreover, Punishment Naturalists argue, the innate nature of our
intuitions about wrongdoing is of significant practical consequence. The
fact that our intuitions arise from millions of years of shared evolutionary pressure matters because, if true, attempts to educate individuals
away from their innate instincts are likely to be controversial, costly,
30
and largely ineffective. Whatever pressures may have produced our
innate sense of morality over the course of our evolution, they argue, “it
is [now] beyond the normal influence of culture or demographic. If it
were not so insulated, one would see differences in intuitions of justice
31
among different demographics and cultures.” Upon reflection, we
might not like what our instincts tell us; but we should know what these
instincts are. Highlighting the potential clash between socially constructed norms and natural intuitions, they argue that
policy wonks and politicians should listen more closely to . . . the
moral voice of our species. . . . [For] in developing policies that
dictate what people ought to do, we are more likely to construct
long-lasting and effective policies if we take into account the intuitive biases that guide our initial responses to the imposition of
32
social norms.
The level of specificity at which the hypothesized innate mechanisms operate is crucial. Punishment Realists and Punishment Naturalists
alike accept some form of innate sensitivity to social norms as part of

28 See, for example, Marc D. Hauser, The Liver and the Moral Organ, 1 Soc Cog & Affective Neurosci 214, 214–15 (2006); Susan Dwyer, How Good Is the Linguistic Analogy?, in Peter
Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich, eds, 2 The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition
237, 238 (Oxford 2006).
29 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1664 (cited in note 14).
30 See Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 18 (cited in note 15) (arguing that “deviations [from humans’ innate intuitions about punishment] can have undesirable consequences and
unjustified costs that can ultimately hurt rather than help effective crime control”).
31 Id at 11.
32 Hauser, Moral Minds at xx (cited in note 26). See also Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L
Rev at 11 (cited in note 15) (“This insulation [from culture] means that there may be serious
limits on whether and how social engineers can manipulate intuitions of justice, at least those
intuitions of justice about core wrongdoing upon which there is broad agreement.”).
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33

humans’ capacity to learn. But the form of naturalism that we are describing rejects the notion that moral intuitions are principally the result
of generic abilities to develop and act in response to socially constructed and shared meanings. The naturalism of the scholars we describe here, while readily admitting that individuals are made sensitive
to norms by something like generic cognitive mechanisms, rejects innate-norm-sensitivity accounts as too limited, lacking in specialized
cognitive mechanisms that supply much of the content of morality. Instead, naturalists argue, humans have cognitive features that determine
the structure of highly predictable and largely invariant intuitions about
wrongdoing, intuitions that began as advantageous human variations
among our ancestors and, over centuries, were continually selected and
refined as collective heritable traits. Although humans are not, on the
naturalist account, identical moral machines, our innate moral intuitions
are shared at surprisingly fine levels of granularity because of innate
cognitive structures rather than socially acquired norms.
In support of these claims, naturalists offer empirical studies documenting the extent to which individuals share intuitions about
whether acts are wrongful and how wrongful they are. They also develop an account of the sources of agreement and disagreement. Let
us review each claim—the extent of shared intuitions and the source
of this agreement and disagreement—in turn.
A. The Extent of Shared Intuitions
Where crime and punishment are concerned, humans certainly
appear to disagree quite often; headlines and policy debates are filled,
34
it seems, with clashing moral accounts. Is it possible that there is a
deeper order lurking within the variance and dissensus that we observe around us? A growing number of researchers argue that there is
a structure to our intuitions that is both nuanced and pervasive. Paul
Robinson and Robert Kurzban, two prominent theorists working in
the area of criminal law, have developed some of the most striking
empirical studies supporting naturalist claims. Reviewing dozens of
studies and conducting several themselves, they write:

33 There are dozens of norms-based models of cognition. For a recent review and addition,
see Chandra Sekhar Sripada and Stephen Stich, A Framework for the Psychology of Norms, in
Carruthers, Laurence, and Stich, eds, The Innate Mind 280, 289–90 (cited in note 28) (arguing that
the “acquisition mechanism” people use to observe the existence of a norm “is both automatic
and involuntary”).
34 See, for example, Dan M. Kahan and Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of
Self-Defense, 45 Am Crim L Rev 1, 6–8 (2008) (listing potentially clashing justifications for selfdefense doctrine).
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[A]vailable evidence suggests that human intuitions of justice
about core wrongdoing . . . are deep, predictable, and widely
shared. While there are disagreements about the relative blameworthiness of wrongdoing outside the core, the core wrongs
themselves—physical aggression, takings without consent, and
deception in exchanges—are the subject of nuanced and specific
35
intuitions that cut across demographics.
The studies to which Robinson, Kurzban, and other naturalists cite
involve participants who have been asked to rank the seriousness of
offenses. The remarkable thing about such ranking exercises, they
suggest, is the relatively stable rank order of the offenses evaluated
by participants.
Consider the following sample from one recent study conducted
by Robinson and Kurzban. Topping out the serious end of the spectrum is kidnapping an eight-year-old girl for ransom, raping her, recording her screams while burning her with a cigarette lighter, and
then killing her once a demanded ransom is received. Consistently
ranked as less serious than that is keeping pitbulls that escape repeatedly and ultimately kill someone. Less serious than that is slapping
(and thus bruising) a man wearing a hat that makes fun of the defendant’s favorite band. Less serious still is stealing a drill from a garage.
And at the bottom of the culpability spectrum is taking (without eat36
ing) two whole pies from an “all you can eat” buffet.
That list is not exhaustive; the study includes over twenty acts
that participants rank, and which they rank with a very high degree of
consistency and ease. (A full listing of the offenses is provided in the
Appendix.) How consistently do members of the public rank these
offenses? Participants agreed on 91.8 percent of all pairwise judg37
ments, and the ranking produces a Kendall’s W of 0.88. As you might
imagine, the most common disagreements were on those acts that
were ranked just next to one another. When the researchers discounted the “flipping” of adjacent offenses, the extent of agreement
38
rose to 93.9 percent.
A summary of the scenarios and their rankings is provided in Table 1 below, and full descriptions are provided in the Appendix. Notice that the first four scenarios were generally thought to deserve no

35

Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1892 (cited in note 13).
Id at 1869 (providing a table ranking behavior according to the amount of punishment
the study’s subjects believed was warranted).
37 Id at 1877–78.
38 Id at 1878 (noting that one-third of all deviations were “adjacent flip” deviations).
36
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punishment and thus are unranked. The following offenses are listed
in order of ranked seriousness.
TABLE 1. RANKINGS OF RELATIVE WRONGFULNESS BY VARIOUS
39
DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS
All
Non<$60K >$60K
<2yr
>2yr
Subjects Male Female white White Income* Income* Degree Degree

Act

Self-defense
0†
0
0
0
0
Coerced theft
0
0
0
0
0
Umbrella mistake
0
0
0
0
0
Hallucination
0
0
0
0
0
Pies
5
5
5
5
5
Short change
6
6
6
7
6
T-shirt
7
6
7
6
7
Radio theft
8
8
8
7,8‡
8
Drill theft
9
9
9
9
9
Microwave theft
10
10
11
11
10
TV destruction
11
11
11
8
11
Slap
12
12
12
12
12
Head-butt
13
13
13
13
13
Stitches
14
14
14
14
14
Necklace & stitches
15
15
15
15
15
Robbery
16
16
16
16
16
Clubbing
17
17
17
17
17
Pitbulls
18
18
18
18
18
Infant
19
19
19
19
19
Stabbing
20
20
20
20
20
Ambush
21
21
21
21
21
Abduction
22
22
22
22
22
Burning
23
23
23
23
23
Ransom
24
24
24
24
24
N=
246
123
123
53
193
* Forty-one subjects did not provide income information.
† “No punishment” as the modal response is shown as 0.
‡ The two ranks were a tie, thus both modes are reported.

0
0
0
0
5
6
7
8
9
11
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
102

0
0
0
0
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
103

0
0
0
0
5
6
7
8
9
11
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
169

0
0
0
0
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
15
14
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
77

Not only are the rankings highly consistent, but the researchers
40
found “little variation in the modes of scenario rankings” across a
broad array of demographic variables (arrayed across the top of Table 1
above). In addition to these demographic variables, the researchers
also report that an “investigation of . . . political party, ideology, marital status, whether they have children, religion, level of religious activity, [and] libertarianism showed a similar lack of any meaningful differ41
ence between demographic groups’ modal rankings.”
The acts ranked here are also, Robinson and Kurzban claim,
broadly representative of criminal wrongdoing more generally. While
they concede that individuals disagree about the wrongfulness of some
acts, these divisive acts are outside of what the researchers consider to
39
40
41

Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1879 (cited in note 13).
Id.
Id at 1879 n 200.
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be the “core” of wrongdoing: “physical aggression, takings without
42
consent, and deceit in exchange.” The core, by Robinson and Kurzban’s estimation, comprises the vast majority of criminal conduct:
43
“94.9% of the offenses committed in the United States.”
Nor are these findings specific to a single time or place. While
Robinson and Kurzban’s is the most striking of recent studies conducted in the United States, ranking studies of this sort have been
conducted for over forty years and in a number of countries with similar results. Thorsten Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang’s classic 1964 study
demonstrated that Americans consistently ranked many crimes in the
same order, and that these could be reliably reported as an index of
44
crime seriousness. Dogan Akman and Andre Normandeau’s 1967
study reported similar findings across a dozen samples taken from
various Canadian locales, concluding that rankings of many offenses
45
were stable and reliable enough to construct a crime index for Canada.
In 1980 Sandra Evans and Joseph Scott reported that American and
46
Kuwaiti students ranked many offenses and punishments similarly.
And in 2006, Sergio Herzog reported remarkable similarities in the
rankings of offense seriousness across cultural groups in his study of
47
Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews.
Robinson and Kurzban are careful to note that agreement on the
relative seriousness of various forms of wrongdoing is not equivalent to
agreement on how to punish in absolute terms. Some individuals may be
more punitive than others overall, generating disagreement that has
long masked the pervasive structure of our punishment intuitions about
42

Id at 1892.
Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1867 (cited in note 13).
44 See generally Thorsten Sellin and Marvin E. Wolfgang, The Measurement of Delinquency 263–65 (Wiley 1964) (finding similar rankings among judges, police officers, and two groups of
students, despite their positions in very “different sociocultural groups”). Several studies have
since replicated and extended these findings in the United States. See, for example, Don C. Gibbons, Crime and Punishment: A Study in Social Attitudes, 47 Soc Forces 391, 395 (1969) (studying
proposed sentences among Californians and finding general agreement on which crimes should
get severe versus more moderate punishment); Peter H. Rossi, et al, The Seriousness of Crimes:
Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 Am Soc Rev 224, 230–31 (1974) (finding
broad agreement on assessments of crime seriousness among residents of Baltimore regardless
of race, sex, or educational attainment); Stephen D. Gottfredson, Kathy L. Young, and William S.
Laufer, Additivity and Interactions in Offense Seriousness Scales, 17 J Rsrch Crime & Delinq 26,
29 (1980) (studying the relative-seriousness rankings of several criminal offenses by undergraduate and graduate students at Johns Hopkins University). See also Monica A. Walker, Measuring
the Seriousness of Crimes, 18 Brit J Criminol 348, 348–51 (1978). But see Parts II and III.
45 See Dogan D. Akman and Andre Normandeau, The Measurement of Crime and Delinquency in Canada, 7 Brit J Criminol 129, 147 (1967).
46 See Sandra S. Evans and Joseph E. Scott, The Seriousness of Crime Cross-Culturally, 22
Criminol 39, 48–49 (1980).
47 See Sergio Herzog, Public Perceptions of Crime Seriousness: A Comparison of Social
Divisions in Israel, 39 Isr L Rev 57, 59, 66 (2006).
43
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wrongfulness. To use the analogy to Chomskian “universal grammar”
that many naturalists employ, the relative order in which wrongdoings
are ranked is a “principle” determined by a moral mechanism or
module in the brain, and the amount of punishment to be meted out—
the “end point[s] of the punishment continuum,” as Robinson and
48
Kurzban say —is a “parameter” that may be set by culture, expe49
rience, and other non-innate influences on preference.
On the naturalist account, then, while we may disagree over some
things, this superficial dissensus masks the deeper structure of our
shared intuitions. Looking for the kinds of serious disagreements that
are often described as refuting naturalist accounts, Robinson and
Kurzban report having “failed to find the limits of shared intuitions of
50
justice for core wrongdoing.” The levels of agreement in rank order51
ing are, they argue, “astonishingly high.”
B.

The Source of Shared Intuitions

Researchers involved in these studies describe the degree of
52
shared intuitions about wrongdoing and punishment as “stunning[],”
53
54
55
“remarkable,” “striking,” and even “shock[ing].” To explain the extraordinary concordance they see, they develop an evolutionary theory
of human psychology. By and large, they propose one or more specialized cognitive mechanisms developed in response to evolutionary pressures. As Marc Hauser writes: “Part of [our natural sense of justice] was
designed by the blind hand of Darwinian selection millions of years
before our species evolved; other parts were added or upgraded over
the evolutionary history of our species, and are unique both to humans
56
and to our moral psychology.” For naturalists, developing a moral sen57
sibility over the course of a lifetime is “like growing a limb” —a highly
specialized form that normally develops in a predictable manner.
48

Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1855 (cited in note 13).
Hauser develops this concept extensively. See Hauser, Moral Minds at 419–20 (cited in
note 26).
50 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1867 (cited in note 13).
51 Id.
52 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1654 (cited in note 14).
53 Evans and Scott, 22 Criminol at 53 (cited in note 46).
54 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1638 (cited in note 14). See also Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1867–74 (cited in note 13).
55 Joss Whedon, dir, Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog Act 2, 00:11:59 (2008), online at
http://drhorrible.com (visited May 1, 2010) (“All the time that you beat me unconscious I forgive / . . . It’s a brand new me / I got no remorse / Now the water’s rising / . . . I’m gonna shock the
world / Gonna show Bad Horse.”).
56 Hauser, Moral Minds at xvii (cited in note 26).
57 Id at xviii (clarifying that the acquisition of moral norms does not occur through formal
education).
49
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The advantages that these intuitions provide are often not specific to an individual, they argue, but rather accrue to kin groups, to local
populations, or to the species as a whole. Thus, while it may be costly
for an individual to demand or inflict punishment on another for a
core wrongdoing, overall the group to which that individual belongs
(and, presumably, within which she has many genetic relatives) will
thrive if she does. Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones develop a specific
conception of the mechanism by which our shared intuitions have
evolved, one that rests on the conditions of mutual interdependence
and social interaction:
We argue . . . that human sociality has laid the foundation for an
evolved predisposition to acquire shared intuitions of justice and
that such intuitions benefit the individuals bearing them. . . .
[E]volution has in particular contributed to intuitions that physical harm, the taking of property, and cheating in exchanges are
58
matters for particular attention and condemnation.
Another way to put this is that specific forms of antisocial behavior
are evolutionarily counterproductive, so groups (and individuals in
groups) that have innate rules that foster cooperation—including cooperation around punishment—are more likely to thrive.
In support of this theory, researchers commonly cite two pools of
59
evidence: experimental games of cooperation and punishment among
humans, and studies that turn on distinctions between moral and conventional wrongdoing. We review each of these in turn.
1. Fairness games.
Consider, first, one of the most common tools for assessing how
individuals assess fairness and how much they are willing to sacrifice
60
to punish someone who is behaving unfairly: the “Ultimatum Game.”
The structure of the game is simple. Two people—a “Proposer” and a

58

Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1646 (cited in note 14).
Naturalists provide other evidence, though in general it tends to be at a greater inferential remove. Brain imaging studies, for example, are cited quite often. While these studies do
provide insight into which regions of the brain (it is usually multiple regions) are most active
when individuals are attempting to resolve various problems, they do not provide much in the
way of evidence about whether the content is innate or learned. There is, so far as we can discern,
no evidence that moral decisions are made exclusively or even predominantly by regions of the
brain that are responsive to only “innate,” as opposed to “learned,” intuitions. See id at 1659–64
(arguing, based on neurological studies, that “basic moral sentiments humans share are products
of evolutionary processes”). See also id at 1655–59 (providing evidence from animal studies); id
at 1664–74 (providing evidence from studies of child development).
60 Joseph Henrich, et al, “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 Behav & Brain Sci 795, 798 (2005).
59
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“Responder”—are anonymously paired. The Proposer is offered a
modest or significant amount of money. She then proposes a split of
the money with the Responder. The Responder decides whether to
accept the split or reject it. If she accepts, both will get the amount
allocated by the proposed split. If she rejects, neither gets anything.
One common interpretation of such a rejection is that it is a form of
punishment that the Responder visits on the Proposer for being unfair, a punishment that costs whatever the Responder would have received had she accepted the Proposer’s suggested split.
If humans are selfish actors in the way neoclassical economics posits, then the Responder would never reject an offer greater than zero,
no matter how small. Why? A rational Responder should accept an offer of any size because some money, no matter how little, is better than
no money. As such, every neoclassically rational and selfish Proposer
would offer as little as possible, keeping the lion’s share for herself.
Yet in most studies of industrialized societies, the mean offer is be61
tween 40 percent and 50 percent. Moreover, if Proposers offer significantly less than this, Responders tend to reject the offers in proportion
to their divergence from the norm. But few people make such low of62
fers. Indeed, experimenters often had to add in random offers to test
the lower bounds of what a Responder would accept because Proposers
deviated from the mode so rarely and, when they did, by very little. The
consistency of these findings across a range of settings led many re63
searchers to posit a “taste” for fairness at approximately these levels.
Marc Hauser has conducted a number of studies of the Ultimatum
64
Game. In a recent version broadcast on national television, for example, he gave half of a group of students some Skittles candies and had
them determine whether and how many they wanted to share with
those who were given none. To a person, they all gave half. The reason?

61

Id at 801.
Id at 797 (characterizing the infrequent nature of low offers as demonstrative of fairness
and concerns of reciprocity).
63 See, for example, James Konow, A Positive Theory of Economic Fairness, 31 J Econ
Behav & Org 13, 32–33 (1996) (identifying accountability, altruism, and efficiency as important
motivators); Gary E. Bolton and Rami Zwick, Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining, 10 Games & Econ Behav 95, 113 (1995) (arguing that “punishment for unfair treatment”
accounted for most of the variation from perfect equilibrium play in the study’s results); Colin
Camerer and Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J Econ Persp
209, 216 (1995) (explaining that etiquette and perceived norms of fairness often overcome income maximization as motives in the Ultimatum Game); Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments,
in John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, eds, The Handbook of Experimental Economics 253, 264–65
(Princeton 1995) (detailing types of bargaining experiments and noting that some theorists have
rallied around the explanatory power of fairness considerations).
64 See “Modern Morality: Inside the Brain,” ABC News (ABC television broadcast,
May 2, 2007).
62
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When pressed, the students gave explanations that seem either intuitive
or like a confabulation to most people: “Because then . . . you all get the
65
same amount.” To them, it was just natural to share equally.
Like Hauser, most naturalists describe the typical deviation from
the rational-actor model in evolutionary terms. The argument for naturalism based on these games is that natural selection has crafted a
sense of fairness in humans that might be modified modestly by experience but is essentially innate. Fairness, on this account, is no more
cultural than any other human organ; instead, it is an organic “moral
faculty—an organ of the mind that carries a universal grammar of
66
action.” On this account, the limited range of fairness is part of human adaptive fitness, and the “architecture of our mind, leftover cir67
cuitry from the cavemen.”
Hauser’s theory also comes with at least one prediction. Because
these constraints on fairness have long been essential to our survival,
he argues that “no culture will ever [accept] offers under 15 percent,
and no culture will ever offer more than 50 percent. If they do, such
68
patterns will exist for the blink of an eye in human history.” We return to Hauser’s claim later, as it shares a form of logical error common to many naturalist claims about punishment and human intuition.
2. Conventional and moral wrongdoing.
A second body of work cited as supporting the naturalist account
derives from empirical studies distinguishing “moral” from “convention69
al” wrongdoing, a distinction that roughly tracks the legal distinction
between acts that are traditionally described in legal parlance as mala in
70
se and mala prohibita. Following Elliot Turiel, Judith Smetana, and
65

Id.
Hauser, Moral Minds at 11 (cited in note 26).
67 Id at 85–86.
68 We have corrected a typo here; Hauser writes: “no culture will ever reject offers under
15 percent,” id at 85, but that cannot be what he means because most do. But see notes 119–29 and
accompanying text (critiquing this form of hypothesizing in general and describing experiments
among the Sukuma in Mahenge, Tanzania that exceed Hauser’s hypothesized bounds on fairness).
69 For early research in this area, see generally Larry P. Nucci and Elliot Turiel, Social
Interactions and the Development of Social Concepts in Preschool Children, 49 Child Dev 400
(1978); Judith G. Smetana, Preschool Children’s Conceptions of Moral and Social Rules, 52 Child
Dev 1333 (1981); Larry P. Nucci and Maria Santiago Nucci, Children’s Social Interactions in the
Context of Moral and Conventional Transgressions, 53 Child Dev 403 (1982). Some, following
Turiel, suggest a third category of “personal” wrongs. See, for example, Jenny Yau and Judith G.
Smetana, Conceptions of Moral, Social-Conventional, and Personal Events among Chinese Preschoolers in Hong Kong, 74 Child Dev 647 (2003).
70 Many legal scholars have argued that a context-independent distinction between the two
is impossible. See, for example, Peter Alldridge, Making Criminal Law Known, in Stephen C.
Shute and A.P. Simester, eds, Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part 103, 106–10
(Oxford 2002) (discussing the difficulties of distinguishing these categories, particularly when
66
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Larry Nucci’s early empirical work in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
these studies suggest that humans, in the course of normal development, learn to distinguish moral wrongs, which implicate “justice,
rights, or welfare” (hitting, stealing, or refusing to share an abundant
good, for example), from conventional wrongs, which merely violate a
local convention (wearing pajamas to school or work, swearing, or
eating lunch while standing up, for example). Conventional transgressions are thought to be less serious, and assessments of their seriousness are dependent on context and rules set by authorities; moral
transgressions, on the other hand, are thought to be more serious, typically involving clear harm to a victim, and the seriousness of the
transgression is thought to be “authority independent”—that is, it
72
does not depend on what any authority says is acceptable.
Naturalists often cite studies of moral and conventional wrongs
showing that children appear to learn that hurting others is wrong
before they learn other norms. For example, the finding that “the first
moral concept to appear in children is the concept that physical aggression is wrong” is relevant, Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones argue,
because it seems “likely more than coincidence that this is also the
first step in [a naturalist] account of the evolutionary origins of intuitive
73
justice.” That is, the development of morality in childhood parallels

applied to market situations where it is unclear whether the legal rule is simply “declaring the
pre-legal public wrongfulness of the actions in question”); Nancy Travis Wolfe, Mala In Se: A
Disappearing Doctrine?, 19 Criminol 131, 139–40 (1981) (arguing that mala prohibita offenses
are different from mala in se offenses only in that the legislatures have labeled them as such).
71 See Larry P. Nucci, Conceptual Development in the Moral and Conventional Domains:
Implications for Values Education, 52 Rev Educ Rsrch 93, 100 (1982) (describing early studies by
Turiel, Nucci, and Smetana in which subjects evaluated less wrongful actions “in terms of their
relation to the social order, social expectations, social institutions, and contextual or culturally
specific regulations and standards of behavior” and more wrongful actions “in terms of the effects the actions had on the rights or well-being of others”).
72 There are several good reviews of the literature. See, for example, Judith G. Smetana,
Understanding of Social Rules, in Mark Bennett, ed, The Development of Social Cognition: The
Child as Psychologist 111, 112–14 (Guilford 1993); Marie S. Tisak, Domains of Social Reasoning
and Beyond, in Ross Vasta, ed, 11 Annals of Child Development 95, 100–01 (Jessica Kingsley
1995); Larry P. Nucci, Education in the Moral Domain 7–9 (Cambridge 2001). See generally
Larry P. Nucci, Elliot Turiel, and Gloria Encarnacion-Gawrych, Children’s Social Interactions and
Social Concepts: Analyses of Morality and Convention in the Virgin Islands, 14 J Cross-Cult Psych
469 (1983) (finding that adults and preschoolers from the Virgin Islands responded to “moral
transgressions” by pointing out the hurtful or unjust consequences of the actions upon victims,
but reacted to “conventional” transgressions by referring back to aspects of the social order);
Marida Hollos, Philip E. Leis, and Elliot Turiel, Social Reasoning in Ijo Children and Adolescents
in Nigerian Communities, 17 J Cross-Cult Psych 352 (1986) (finding that Nigerian children’s
“moral” and “conventional” judgments can be distinguished along similar axes); Yau and Smetana, 74 Child Dev 647 (cited in note 69) (finding that Chinese preschool children also treated
“personal,” “moral,” and “conventional” events differently).
73 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1670 (cited in note 14).
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74

the evolutionary development of the moral organ. Lack of cooperation around physical aggression would, on this account, pose especially
grave risks to survival, so intuitions governing its regulation would be
the most fundamental and earliest to develop.
Over the last quarter century, several researchers have reported
similar patterns across a diverse set of subjects ranging in age from
toddlers as young as three-and-a-half years to adults, with a substan75
tial array of different nationalities and religions. Reading these studies, naturalists have drawn the inference that these distinctions between moral and conventional wrongs are “universally recognized,
similar among boys and girls, and even consistent in cultures with
76
seemingly different parental styles—in China and the United States.”
Moreover, they argue, because these studies tend to show that
77
“moral rules are inviolable and universally applicable,” they can be
taken as evidence of an “evolutionary explanation for the origins of
78
intuitions of justice.”
In light of the universal nature of these intuitions, naturalists suggest that the alternative is simply implausible:
If there were no specific developmental system for the acquisition of moral intuitions, if intuitions of justice were simply a matter of general social learning, then the developmental route of
the acquisition of intuitions of justice would depend on the environment in which the child developed. The things that the child
learned were wrong would include acts the child witnessed, ideas
communicated through language, pedagogy from various sources,
and so forth. Because all of these elements are likely to differ
widely across cultures, and even across family and peer groups
74 This argument echoes Ernst Haeckel’s fascinating recapitulation theory, which (incorrectly) held that “ontogeny recapitulated phylogeny”—that is, that the physical development of
each human over the course of its lifetime parallels the evolutionary development of the species.
See Stephen Jay Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny 7–9 (Belknap 1977) (discussing the origins of
the recapitulation theory and arguing that it collapsed once “Mendelian genetics repudiated the
generality of its two necessary principles—terminal addition and condensation”).
75 See Nucci, Turiel, and Encarnacion-Gawrych, 14 J Cross-Cult Psych at 469 (cited in
note 72) (studying Virgin Islands children and adults); Hollos, Leis, and Turiel, 17 J Cross-Cult Psych
at 352 (cited in note 72) (studying Nigerian children); Yau and Smetana, 74 Child Dev at 647 (cited
in note 69) (studying Hong Kong preschoolers). For reviews, see Smetana, Understanding of Social
Rules at 126–33 (cited in note 72) (discussing research in various domestic contexts as well as in
such countries as Japan and Zambia); Tisak, Domains of Social Reasoning at 103 (cited in note 72)
(discussing results across age ranges); Nucci, Education in the Moral Domain at 20–51, 94–106 (cited
in note 72) (discussing results across a variety of religions and cultures).
76 Hauser, Moral Minds at 291 (cited in note 26).
77 Id at 292.
78 Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1666 (cited in note 14) (finding collateral support for this explanation in evidence that “children everywhere progress through similar
stages of moral reasoning about justice at roughly the same ages”).
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within cultures, such a general learning system would yield very
different paths and timing in the acquisition of intuitions of jus79
tice for different individuals.
In short, they argue, there is profound agreement on the core moral
wrongs that we confront, and that agreement appears to be intuitive,
nuanced, and organic—in all probability the product of a specialized
and innate cognitive moral organ that has developed over millions of
years through natural selection.
II. PROBLEMS WITH NATURALISM
Naturalists have assembled an impressive collection of studies in
support of their claims, and the literature on precisely which aspects of
80
morality are innate has become a booming cottage industry. Moreover, they do so by referencing empirical data, which is surely an ad81
vance on many earlier anecdotal studies. But they face a host of
problems. Some stem from simple logical missteps that underlie their
most strident claims. A more serious problem is posed by empirical
evidence contradicting the central claim that evaluations of serious
wrongfulness do not vary across social conditions or individuals. Setting up the discussion of Punishment Realism in Part III, this Part
starts with a few basic examples that give a sense of the research that
naturalists have overlooked or failed to incorporate, then describes
82
some of their broader logical errors.
79

Id.
See generally Erica Roedder and Gilbert Harman, Grammar, in John M. Doris, Shaun
Nichols, and Stephen Stich, eds, Empirical Moral Psychology (Oxford forthcoming 2010); Ron
Mallon, Reviving Rawls’s Linguistic Analogy Inside and Out, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed, 2
Moral Psychology: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity 145 (MIT 2008);
Jesse Prinz, Resisting the Linguistic Analogy: A Commentary on Hauser, Young, and Cushman, in
Sinnott-Armstrong, ed, The Cognitive Science of Morality 157 (rejecting the analogy to Noam
Chomsky’s “universal grammar” by suggesting that “general-purpose emotion systems and socially transmitted rules” could be an alternate explanation for the empirical findings of Hauser
and others); Frances Myrna Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible
Harm (Oxford 2007); John Mikhail, Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future,
11 Trends Cog Sci 143 (2007); Hauser, Moral Minds (cited in note 26).
81 See generally Robinson, Empirical Desert (cited in note 25) (describing the relative
virtues of empirical conceptions of desert).
82 We do not mean to select Paul Robinson, Robert Kurzban, John Darley, and Owen
Jones for special scrutiny; in fact, they are to be applauded for presenting claims in a manner that
is amenable to critical examination and testing. Other naturalists who cite many of the same
studies theorize a “universal moral grammar” that has, so far as we can tell, no rules that can
actually be tested. As Michael Waldmann has noted, the notion of a universal moral grammar is
developed without an explanation of what, exactly, distinguishes the rules from parameters in the
proposed universal moral grammar:
80

Findings that show that different cultures generate similar intuitions . . . are viewed as evidence
for universal rules, whereas other studies showing huge cultural differences are interpreted as
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A. Some Skepticism about Scope
One of the first major hurdles that naturalism faces is the tremendous scope of disagreement over what constitutes wrongdoing. Naturalists’ principle strategy is to suggest that the disagreements are relatively minor and cloud our view of the inner workings of moral intuition. There are disagreements about crimes, they concede, but these are
marginal crimes, relatively infrequent when compared to the “core”
crimes on which there is significant agreement. As noted above, Robinson and Kurzban, drawing on data from the National Criminal Victimization Survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, claim that
the “kinds of offenses in the scenarios” they study “represent 94.9% of
83
the offenses committed in the United States.” As such, the kinds of
offenses on which people disagree are necessarily less common.
But is the public really in agreement about the relative seriousness
of the vast majority of bad acts committed in the United States? Anyone familiar with the source of these data will immediately recognize
one problem with the claim: a survey of criminal victimization does not
include any so-called “victimless” or “vice” crimes—crimes over which
84
there is tremendous public disagreement. As indicated in Tables 2 and 3
below, the incidence of these crimes greatly outnumbers the incidence
of criminal victimizations. Indeed, the number of people estimated to be
using marijuana in the last year alone exceeded the number of all those
estimated to have suffered criminal victimization of any kind. Add prostitution (recent studies find that more than one in six adult males has
85
paid for sex ) and you begin to see just how common controversial
crimes are. Also excluded from the list are a number of regulatory
crimes. While far harder to estimate, surveys suggest that rates of willful
tax evasion—the seriousness of which is also disputed—run as high as
86
25 percent of the population.

evidence for the role of parameters. This flexibility of the theory makes it hard to envision
what could constitute a strict empirical test of the theory.
Indeed, many of the empirical studies [cited] could even be taken as evidence against the
moral grammar view.
Michael R. Waldmann, A Case for the Moral Organ?, 314 Sci 57, 57 (2006).
83 See note 43 and accompanying text.
84 Whether or not they are actually “victimless” is one of the points of contention.
85 See sources cited in note 91.
86 See Robert Mason and Lyle D. Calvin, A Study of Admitted Income Tax Evasion, 13 L &
Socy Rev 73, 80–81 (1978) (reporting that 24.2 percent of survey respondents had either overstated deductions, underreported income, or failed to file altogether).
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TABLE 2. INCIDENCE OF CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION: 2006
Criminal Victimization

Incidence

Murder
Rape/Sexual assault
Robbery
Assault
Household burglary
Motor vehicle theft
Theft
Any criminal victimization

17,034
260,940
712,610
5,120,840
3,560,920
992,260
14,362,570
25,200,384

TABLE 3. INCIDENCE OF VICE CRIMES
Crime

Incidence
88

Marijuana use
89
Underage drinking
90
Tax evasion
91
Paying for sex

16,700,000/mo
27.2% of 12–20 year-olds
24% of adults
15% of adult men

87 Statistics for all crimes but murder taken from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National
Crime Victimization Survey for 2006. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization in
the United States, 2006 Statistical Tables *14 table 1 (Aug 2008), online at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cvus06.pdf (visited May 1, 2010). Murder Statistics taken from the 2006 Uniform
Crime Report. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report: Crime in the United
States, 2006: Murder *2 (Sept 2007), online at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/documents/
murdermain.pdf (visited May 1, 2010).
88 US Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration, 1 Results from the 2009 National Survey on Drug Use and Health:
Summary of National Findings 13 (Sept 2010), online at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/
2k9NSDUH/2k9ResultsP.pdf (visited Sept 24, 2010).
89 Id at 35.
90 Mason and Calvin, 13 L & Socy Rev at 80–81 (cited in note 86) (reporting a tax evasion
rate of 24.2 percent).
91 Robert T. Michael, et al, Sex in America: A Definitive Survey 63 (Little, Brown 1994). See
also ABC News Primetime Live, The American Sex Survey: A Peek beneath the Sheets 1 (Oct 21,
2004), online at http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/959a1AmericanSexSurvey.pdf (visited
May 1, 2010) (indicating that 15 percent of all men report that they have “paid for sex”). Of
course, given the continued illegality in the United States of all of the activities described in
Table 3, it is likely that all of these numbers are underreported. Consider also Andre Jeannin, et
al, Patterns of Sex Work Contact among Men in the General Population of Switzerland, 1987–2000,
84 Sexually Transmitted Infections 556, 556 (2008) (indicating that 23 percent of Swiss men
between the ages of 31 and 45 reported purchasing sex from a prostitute); Theo Sandfort, et al,
Sexual Behavior and HIV Risk: Common Patterns and Differences between European Countries,
in Michel Hubert, Nathalie Bajos, and Theo Sandfort, eds, Sexual Behaviour and HIV/AIDS in
Europe: Comparisons of National Surveys 403, 410 (UCL 1998) (indicating that 38.6 percent of
adult men in Spain reported paying for sex in their lifetime).
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These estimates are, of course, quite rough. But the point stands:
even if we were to add only those crimes listed in Table 3—and there
92
are many more that could be added —the crimes of the sort that naturalists believe form stable rankings turn out to be in the minority
rather than the majority.
Another reason to be skeptical of the suggestion that we share intuitions about most classes of wrongful acts is that the classes of acts
listed also exclude acts that a substantial number of Americans believe
should be crimes, but which are not—a few of which are summarized
in Table 4 below. For example, while hard to estimate with a high degree of accuracy, most researchers estimate that there are more than
93
one million abortions performed each year in the United States.
Sodomy, which was illegal until quite recently in many jurisdictions, is
estimated to be more common among men and women, both straight
and gay, than all violent crime, property crime, and illegal drug use
94
combined. Similarly, more people possess and view pornography than
are listed as victims of all the crimes in the statistics that Robinson
95
and Kurzban cite. Nor does the “core” cover the failure to assist others who are in need—for example, in instances where a person could
96
help a small child who is being abused but does not. These noncriminal acts should also be considered when estimating the extent of
agreement because the theoretical question being addressed is not

92 Child pornography, narcotics use and distribution, public urination, and indecent exposure, to name just a few.
93 See, for example, Rachel K. Jones, et al, Abortion in the United States: Incidence and
Access to Services, 2005, 40 Persp Sex & Repro Health 6, 9 (2008) (estimating that 1,206,200
abortions were performed in 2005); Lawrence B. Finer and Stanley K. Henshaw, Estimates of U.S.
Abortion Incidence, 2001–2003 *2 (Aug 3, 2006), online at http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/2006/08/03/ab_incidence.pdf (visited Sept 25, 2010) (estimating that 1,287,000 abortions
were performed in 2003). See also Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Abortion
Surveillance—United States, 2006 (Nov 27, 2009), online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/ss5808a1.htm?s_cid=ss5808a1_e (visited Sept 25, 2010) (estimating that 846,181
abortions were performed in 2006). But see Rachael K. Jones, et al, Trends in Abortion in the
United States, 52 Clinical Obstetrics & Gynecology 119, 120 (2009) (criticizing the CDC data as
unreliable due to underreporting).
94 See William D. Mosher, Anjani Chandra, and Jo Jones, Sexual Behavior and Selected Health
Measures: Men and Women 15–44 Years of Age, United States, 2002, Adv Data Vital & Health Stats
25 (Sept 15, 2005), online at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad362.pdf (visited May 1, 2010) (indicating that 40 percent of men and 35 percent of women reported having had anal sex by age fortyfour). See also William Saletan, Ass Backwards: The Media’s Silence about Rampant Anal Sex, Slate
(Sept 20, 2005), online at http://www.slate.com/id/2126643 (visited May 1, 2010).
95 ABC News Primetime Live, The American Sex Survey at 2 (cited in note 91) (indicating
that one in five respondents reported having looked at pornography on the Internet).
96 See Stacy Finz, Killing of Girl, 7, in Casino Spurs Good Samaritan Bills, SF Chron A21
(Dec 9, 1998) (observing that the inability to charge a college student for his failure to either
prevent or report the murder of a young girl prompted the legislative introduction of reporting
requirements in California).
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about what happens to be listed in a victimization survey, but about
what kind of wrongdoing is considered serious.
TABLE 4. ESTIMATED INCIDENCE OF CONTROVERSIAL
NONCRIMINAL ACTS
Act

Incidence
97

Sodomy
98
Abortion
99
Internet pornography
100
Gambling
Nude performances
Failure to assist in an emergency

80,000,000/yr
1,000,000/yr
21,000,000/mo
>60% of adults/yr
Unknown
Unknown

How do we know that people disagree about the seriousness of
these criminal and noncriminal acts? For starters, different communities regulate these activities in a wide variety of ways. Prostitution is
101
legal in Nevada, but not in New York; Internet gambling is legal in
102
New York, but not in Louisiana; nude performances are illegal in
103
104
Iowa, but not in California; failing to help someone who is in grave
danger when you can do so without much trouble is not punished in
105
California, but it is in Vermont.
97 People engaging in sodomy per year (presumably some engage in it more than once a
year). See Michael, et al, Sex in America at 140 (cited in note 91) (observing that 10 percent of
men and 9 percent of women have engaged in anal sex within the past twelve months).
98 Jones, et al, 40 Persp Sex & Repro Health at 9 (cited in note 93).
99 People viewing online pornography per month. See Timothy Egan, Erotica Inc: A Special
Report: Technology Sent Wall Street into Market for Pornography, NY Times A1 (Oct 23, 2000).
100 National Opinion Research Center, Report to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission 8 (Apr 1, 1999), online at http://www2.norc.org/new/gamb-fin.htm (visited May 1, 2010)
(showing that 60 percent of women and 67 percent of men had gambled in the previous year).
101 Compare Nev Rev Stat § 244.345 with NY Penal Law § 230.00 (McKinney). Rhode
Island only recently barred citizens from paying money for sex, but street solicitation and the
operation of brothels were already prohibited. See Associated Press, Rhode Island: New Prostitution Law, NY Times A17 (Nov 4, 2009).
102 Compare NY Penal Law §§ 225.00, 225.05, 225.10 (McKinney) (regulating only certain
gambling activities) with La Rev Stat Ann § 14:90.3 (West) (prohibiting Internet gambling). See
also Julia Kollewe, Former Gambling Chief Dicks Is Freed in US, Independent (Sept 30, 2006),
online at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/former-gambling-chief-dicks-is-freedin-us-418184.html (visited May 1, 2010) (noting that the governor of New York refused to sign an
order to extradite an alleged Internet gambler to Louisiana).
103 Iowa Code Ann § 728.5 (West).
104 See Nunez v Holder, 594 F3d 1124, 1144–45 (9th Cir 2010) (Bybee dissenting) (discussing the application of Cal Penal Code § 314, which prohibits indecent exposure, to nude dancing
at clubs).
105 Compare Cal Penal Code § 152.3 (West) (imposing the duty to report only in certain situations involving children) with 12 Vt Stat Ann § 519(a) (Equity) (mandating that a person who
knows that another person is “exposed to grave physical harm” must, under certain circumstances,
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But even more convincing is evidence from experiments conducted by Robinson and Kurzban themselves, reported in the same
article arguing that there was broad agreement on intuitions regarding
106
wrongdoing, summarized in Table 5 below. They found, for example,
that a third of participants thought that smoking marijuana should
bring no penalty at all. A similarly large percentage of the population
felt the same way about prostitution. And while many of the acts that
Robinson and Kurzban included are less controversial (most would
agree that an abortion in the seventh month is wrong, but what about
in the third or fourth month?), they provide enough evidence of public dissensus on these issues to make one wonder how they can be so
confident in their claims that our understandings of wrong acts are so
broadly shared and deeply nuanced.
TABLE 5. SUMMARY OF RANKINGS OF CONTROVERSIAL ACTS
SHOWING SIGNIFICANT DISAGREEMENT OVER
107
RELATIVE WRONGFULNESS
Scenario

Mean
Rank

Modal
Rank

Percent Assigning
“No Liability”

Marijuana
2.2
†
33
Prostitution
2.4
†
30
Cocaine
4.0
†
19
Bestiality
4.2
†
16
Teen alcohol
4.8
5
6
Drunk crash
6.2
6
0
Third theft
7.1
7
0
Late abortion
7.5
12
11
Cocaine dealer
7.9
9
6
Unwanted sex
8.7
11
1
Cocaine importer
8.9
10
6
Rape
11.1
12
0
N = 246
† These scenarios had a modal rank of “no punishment.”

“give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided
by others”). Minnesota also has a statutory duty to assist. See Minn Stat Ann § 604A.01 (West).
106 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1883 (cited in note 13) (“[T]here are punishment-assignment issues on which people do indeed disagree.”).
107 Id at 1887 table 8.
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Core Meltdown

How do naturalists explain this disagreement? These controversial acts, they argue, should not be evaluated alongside the others because they are outside of the “core” of wrongdoing: “physical aggression, takings without consent, and deception in exchanges.” On this
account, there are some acts that are so important to our individual
and collective welfare that we have evolved a shared intuition that
they are wrong; others are less important, so there is more room for
diverse intuitions.
One reason to be unsatisfied with the core–periphery distinction is
that it fails to tell us what, exactly, distinguishes the important core from
the unimportant periphery of crimes. Are we agreed that controversial
acts (incest, abortion, prostitution, mistakes about sexual consent, failing to help a child in need, drug use, whippings, cannibalism, just to
name a few) are unimportant? Sexual misconduct, for example, might
reasonably be included in the “core” on evolutionary grounds, as sexual
activity (so far as we can tell, anyway) is central to continued survival;
and yet there is dramatic cross-cultural disagreement over the enforcement of sexual mores and the punishment of sexual misconduct.
Many of the cross-cultural ranking studies that naturalists cite actually support the conclusion that there is no reliable core–periphery
or moral–conventional distinction. Consider, for example, the rankings
reported by Evans and Scott in their cross-cultural comparison of
crime seriousness among US and Kuwaiti students, excerpts of which
are reported in Table 6 below.
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TABLE 6. A COMPARISON OF SELECTED RANKINGS OF CRIME
108
SERIOUSNESS BY KUWAITI AND US CITIZENS
Description of Act
A married woman committed adultery
A married man committed adultery
A man killed his wife during an argument
A woman engaged in prostitution
A man stabbed his wife with a knife during
an argument
A male engaged in homosexuality
An individual abandoned religion and
espoused atheism
An individual threw burning liquid in
someone’s face, which caused scars
An individual accused a woman of adultery
without adequate proof
A single man committed fornication
A woman had an illegal abortion
An individual intending only to injure
someone by throwing a stone accidentally
killed him

Kuwaiti
US
Ranking Ranking Difference
1
5
6
7
8

32
31
1
29
3

31
26
5
22
5

9
13

34
36

25
23

15

10

5

17

30

13

18
22
25

37
35
6

19
13
19

The disagreements are stark. Notice, for example, that Kuwaitis
rank a woman committing adultery as more serious than a man killing
his wife, and they rank a male engaging in homosexuality as more serious than an individual who throws burning liquid in someone’s face,
causing scars. Americans, in contrast, seem relatively unconcerned
about adultery and homosexuality, and relatively distressed about the
killing of adulterous wives and acid attacks—although, again, there is
significant disagreement across subcommunities in the United States
109
on the former two.

108 Evans and Scott, 22 Criminol at 48–49 table 3 (cited in note 46). Seriousness is ranked
on a scale from one to thirty-seven.
109 While Maryland, for example, has explicitly excluded spousal infidelity as “adequate
provocation” and potential grounds for mitigation of murder to manslaughter, most states have
not. Compare, for example, Md Crim Code Ann § 2-207(b) with Commonwealth v Schnopps, 417
NE2d 1213, 1215–16 (Mass 1981) (holding that the killing of a spouse can be voluntary manslaughter when it immediately follows the victim’s oral admission of adultery).
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The Morality Convention

What of the studies distinguishing moral and conventional
wrongdoing? A series of critiques has been leveled against the moral–
conventional studies, noting that the findings reported depend on
carefully selecting the questions asked. As one group of researchers
recently noted, “the range of transgressions involving harm that has
been included in these studies is remarkably narrow,” typically involving “behaviors that would be familiar to youngsters, such as pulling
110
hair or pushing someone off a swing.” This poses a problem because
teachers across cultures discourage hitting, pulling hair, and so on,
making it difficult to disentangle what is innate from what is learned.
Studies that varied the cultural frame, however, generated substantially different results. Many children, for example, hold clear and
authority-independent intuitions about the wrongness of acts that do
not fit the pattern of moral (rather than conventional) transgressions.
Across many countries, for example, children were found to consistently rank a broad array of transgressions as serious independent of
authority, including “privately washing the toilet bowl with the national flag,” “mixed-sex bathing,” “addressing a teacher by his first name,”
111
and violating a number of religious rules.
Another set of studies has challenged the distinctness of moral
harms. In one study of adults, for example, Daniel Kelly and his fellow
researchers asked participants about a series of paired harms. Here
is one:
(1A) Mr. Williams was an officer on a cargo ship 300 years ago.
One night, while at sea, he found a sailor drunk at a time when
the sailor should have been on watch. After the sailor sobered up,
Williams punished the sailor by giving him 5 lashes with a whip.
Is it OK for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? [Yes/No]
On a scale from 0 (not at all bad) to 9 (very bad), how would you
rate Mr. Williams’ behavior?
(1B) Mr. Adams is an officer on a large modern American cargo
ship in 2004. One night, while at sea, he finds a sailor drunk at a
time when the sailor should have been monitoring the radar
screen. After the sailor sobers up, Adams punishes the sailor by
giving him 5 lashes with a whip.

110 Daniel Kelly, et al, Harm, Affect, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction, 22 Mind &
Lang 117, 121 (2007).
111 Id at 120. See also Nucci, Education in the Moral Domain at 52–75 (cited in note 72)
(discussing these studies in detail).
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[Is it OK for Mr. Adams to whip the sailor? [Yes/No]
On a scale from 0 (not at all bad) to 9 (very bad), how would you
112
rate Mr. Adams’ behavior?]
Based on the notion that moral harms are intuitive and generalizable,
one would expect a consistent answer to both questions. As indicated in
Figure 1 below, however, this was not the case. Rather, most participants
in the study indicated that it was “OK” to whip the sailor three hundred
years ago, while only one in ten thought it was “OK” today. Participants
also considered the two acts to be significantly different when evaluating the wrongfulness of the act (“how bad” the whipping was).
FIGURE 1. JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE ACCEPTABILITY
113
OF WHIPPING A DERELICT SAILOR

Similar variations were observed across several other scenarios, including the acceptability of abusing military trainees when prohibited
and not prohibited by authority, the acceptability of eating the flesh of a
dead person at a funeral when customary and when not customary, a
teacher spanking students when prohibited and not prohibited, and
114
practicing slavery in ancient Rome and in the United States.
The point here is not that we cannot or should not distinguish between more or less wrongful acts. Rather, it is to say that if the main

112

Kelly, et al, 22 Mind & Lang at 123–24 (cited in note 110).
Id at 127–28 (presenting the results of an online survey conducted by the authors). The
bar graph on the left shows the percent of “yes” responses to the binary “Is it OK?” question
2
( = 79.01; p = 0.000). The bar graph on the right represents responses to the question: “How
would you rate Mr. X’s behavior?” (t(198) = 13.55; p = 0.000).
114 See id at 126–28.
113
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distinction that can be made between important and unimportant
criminal offenses is the degree to which individuals agree on them,
then the statement that people tend to agree about core offenses
amounts to saying that people tend to agree about offenses about
which they tend to agree. It is no help to say that what distinguishes
“core” from “periphery” is the importance of the act to our collective
survival if the only manner of discerning the importance of behavior
to our survival is our degree of agreement about the behavior. It is, at
its core (so to speak), a contentless distinction.
D. Playing Fair with Fairness Games
Similar problems have arisen with the studies of ultimatum
games cited by Punishment Naturalists. Many anthropologists and
economists were not satisfied with early research in the field; they
noticed that the studies, while conducted across many countries, all
focused on educated students in highly industrialized societies. They
decided to take the same game further afield to see if the results in
other cultures resembled those reported by researchers studying indi115
viduals who were well integrated into Western capitalist culture.
What they found was revealing. Although something does move
Responders to sacrifice what they might have gained from an unfair
offer to punish the Proposer of the unfair offer, precisely what is con116
sidered fair and unfair varies significantly. For example, in societies
where norms regarding equal distribution are strong, the Proposer is
far more likely to propose something close to an even split than in
societies where egalitarian distribution is not the norm; and if the
Proposer in an egalitarian culture offers a lopsided split benefitting
herself, the Responder is highly likely to reject the proposal, sacrificing
117
her own share to punish the Proposer. But norms regarding fair distribution are far from universal; many societies demand egalitarian sharing while others feature intricately delineated social hierarchies. Consider Figure 2 below, which graphs the wide variation in offers made by
people occupying the role of the Proposer across fifteen societies with

115 See, for example, Alvin E. Roth, et al, Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem,
Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study, 81 Am Econ Rev 1068, 1068–69 (1991).
See also generally Joseph Henrich, et al, Introduction and Guide to the Volume, in Joseph Henrich, et al, eds, Foundations of Human Sociality 1 (Oxford 2004) (describing an account of the
origins of this research).
116 This does not mean that people necessarily conform their behavior to what is considered
fair because they are intrinsically motivated to be fair. It might be the case that individuals adjust
their behavior strategically in order not to be punished for what they believe others will perceive
as unfair behavior.
117 Henrich, et al, 28 Behav & Brain Sci at 812–13 (cited in note 60).
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differing cultural attitudes and a variety of levels of integration into
world markets.
FIGURE 2. MODIFIED BOX PLOT OF ULTIMATUM GAME OFFERS
118
ACROSS FIFTEEN SOCIETIES

One parsimonious explanation for these differences features variations in social meaning. Where there is an expectation of egalitarian
sharing, a proposal that disproportionately rewards one individual at
the expense of another will seem untoward and worthy of punishment.
(Why should one person expect to gain more than another from this
arrangement?) In others, it will seem quite reasonable and sensible
(after all, no matter what the offer, the Responder will be getting

118 Joseph Henrich, et al, “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies *54 figure 2 (working paper), online at http://www.som.yale.edu/
Faculty/keith.chen/negot.%20papers/CamererEtAll_CrossCultUltimatum01.pdf (visited May 1,
2010). For the published version of this paper, see note 60. The box gives the interquartile range for
offers in each society. The vertical line within each box, except for the Machiguenga, is the mean
offer, not the median as in a standard box plot. The mean offer for the Machiguenga lies outside of
the interquartile range and is represented by the vertical line just to the right of the box.
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something for nothing). In both cases, the sense of fairness (or lack
thereof) and the desire to accede (or to punish) will turn on local customs that prescribe what form fairness takes.
The Lamalera, for example, were among the most generous ultimatum players—with Proposers typically offering up half or more
119
than half of the money. They are subsistence whale hunters who
share their bounty communally, often dividing a single whale among a
hundred or more individuals—many of whom help maintain the boats,
dry and cook the meat, or conduct other important non-huntingrelated tasks in the village. Subsequent to a whale hunt, then, the dozen men who ventured out into the sea to catch the whale will typically
take only a small portion of the whale they have caught for themselves. For the Lamalera, the most important part of their subsistence
economy requires regular partitioning of goods in ways that might
seem foolish to Westerners, but which make sense when considering
120
the other benefits that accrue to whale hunters as a result.
The Machiguenga, by contrast, hunt and gather small amounts of
food, largely for themselves and their immediate families. Hunters
(typically men) eat first and typically take the most, followed by wom121
en and children who eat whatever remains. Observers speculate that
this is because men expend a significantly larger amount of energy
hunting and gathering than the women, but, whatever the reason, the
practice appears to instill a very different norm regarding the fair division of goods. The Machiguenga Proposers appear, by Western standards, exceptionally selfish, typically offering only a quarter of the
money. Ethnographers, however, describe them as kind, decent, and
thoughtful; they simply have, the researchers suggest, a different un122
derstanding of what fairness and generosity entail.
Among the Gnau and Au of Papua New Guinea, another set of
norms prevails. With extensive reciprocal demands made of one another (individuals are often expected to give away or share common possessions and goods on demand), receiving a gift is seen as incurring a
kind of burden or debt. Because individuals are expected to reciprocate
gift-giving or incur significant social costs, they are reluctant to accept
offers of gifts that they feel will place a serious potential burden on
119 Sixty-three percent of Proposers divided the pie equally, and most who did not offered
more than 50 percent. Henrich, et al, 28 Behav & Brain Sci at 811 (cited in note 60). See also
generally Michael S. Alvard and David A. Nolin, Rousseau’s Whale Hunt? Coordination among
Big Game Hunters, 43 Curr Anthro 533 (2002).
120 See Alvard and Nolin, 43 Curr Anthro at 540 (cited in note 119).
121 See Ethan Russo, Machiguenga: Peruvian Hunter-Gatherers, 1 Wise Traditions (Summer
2000), online at http://www.westonaprice.org/in-his-footsteps/236-machiguenga.html (visited
Sept 21, 2010).
122 See Henrich, et al, 28 Behav & Brain Sci at 811–13 (cited in note 60).
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123

them. So while an individual may achieve social status through generous giving, others may reject gifts in order to resist indebtedness and its
attendant lower status. Among the Gnau and Au, the Ultimatum Game
generated an exceptionally high number of “fair” (50 percent) and “hyper-fair” (more than 50 percent) offers. But hyper-fair offers were often
rejected. The suggestion by researchers is that this reflected the com124
mon aversion to accepting overly generous gifts.
Hyper-fair offers are not rejected in all societies, though. Among
the Sukuma of southwestern Tanzania (who are not shown on the
chart above), the most common offer was 90 percent, the mean was
125
61 percent, and no offer was rejected. Moreover, participants were
willing to accept offers of as little as 10 percent, even though no person
actually made an offer that low. Again, the researchers explain the
results as reflecting local norms. Sukuma socialize their children to be
extremely generous, requiring them to give away much of their food.
They also have strong ingroup identifications and exceptionally generous responses to poverty, which anthropologists attribute to the stochastic nature of their agricultural economy and the necessity of pool126
ing resources to survive.
If these studies suggest variation among social groups, another set
of studies suggests that conceptions of fairness are socially contingent
even within Westernized societies that are well integrated into the cap127
italist market system. In a series of studies conducted by Swee-Hoon
Chuah, Robert Hoffman, Martin Jones, and Geoffrey Williams in the
United Kingdom and Malaysia, what individuals thought was fair and
the amount that individuals were willing to sacrifice to punish offers

123 Id at 811. Those who repeatedly fail to reciprocate are shunned and disparaged. Consider id at 812.
124 Id at 811. See also Herbert Gintis, et al, Explaining Altruistic Behavior in Humans, 24
Evol & Hum Behav 153, 159 (2003) (“[This] reflects Melanesian culture of status-seeking
through gift giving. Making a large gift is a bid for social dominance in everyday life in these
societies, and rejecting the gift is a rejection of being subordinate.”). The hypothesis offered by
Gintis and his coauthors is consistent with the extensive anthropological literature on reciprocal
exchange in many societies, with “gifts” being thought of as conferring status on the giver and a
burden on the recipient. See, for example, Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for
Exchange in Archaic Societies 65 (Routledge 1990) (W.D. Halls, trans) (originally published
1950) (“The unreciprocated gift still makes the person who has accepted it inferior, particularly
when it has been accepted with no thought of returning it.”).
125 Brian Paciotti and Craig Hadley, The Ultimatum Game in Southwestern Tanzania: Ethnic
Variation and Institutional Scope, 44 Curr Anthro 427, 429–31 (2003).
126 Id at 431.
127 See, for example, Swee-Hoon Chuah, et al, An Economic Anatomy of Culture: Attitudes
and Behaviour in Inter- and Intra-national Ultimatum Game Experiments, 30 J Econ Psych 732,
733 (2009); Swee-Hoon Chuah, et al, Do Cultures Clash? Evidence from Cross-National Ultimatum Game Experiments, 64 J Econ Behav & Org 35, 36 (2007); Roth, et al, 81 Am Econ Rev at
1092 (cited in note 115).
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they thought of as unfair varied significantly with the values they espoused. Individualism, desire for gender equality, and a host of other
values related to market participation strongly influenced the behavior of participants, suggesting that cultural mores within each society
128
were important determinants of fairness as well.
How do naturalists account for this kind of variation in fairness
games? For the most part, they either ignore or gloss over the data.
One strategy, employed by Hauser, is to offer a substantially diminished version of naturalism. On this “softer” naturalism account, we
have not evolved any specific intuitions; rather, we have moral “principles” like fairness, and culture sets the “parameters” that tell us what
is fair and what is not. The “principles and parameters” approach to a
universal moral grammar is employed as an analog to Chomsky’s
“principles and parameters” approach to constructing a universal
grammar of human language. The problem with this tack is that on
this softer account, nature asks culture to do all the work. If fairness
can be whatever culture supplies, then it is not clear what work the
hypothesized moral organ is doing.
The alternative approach (also employed by Hauser at times) is
little better. Arguing that nature sets specific limits on our conception
of fairness requires a specification of what those limits are. Hauser, as
129
we noted above,
very conveniently chooses 15 percent and
50 percent as the lower and upper bounds—precisely the limits observed in the studies he had read at the time! If that is how one determines the limits set by our common moral organ, then it is certainly
true that it will (as a matter of logic) always accurately reflect observed data; but it loses any explanatory or predictive force. It also
cordons off as “parameters” the richness of the social meanings and
practices that give rise to norms governing fairness, sharing, reciprocity, and punishment. Naturalism can tell us nothing about why we have
different intuitions from the Quichua, or why the Quichua have different intuitions from the Sakuma. For that, we need a theory that
incorporates variations in social norms.
Our point here is not that people’s reactions are random or without structure—quite the reverse. There is a deep but highly generalized structure—individuals are willing to make significant sacrifices to
punish those they believe are being unfair—but that structure relies
upon socially constructed norms to give it content. Without recognizing the way social meaning provides for the specific articulation of
that structure, it is impossible to give a coherent interpretation of the
128
129

See Chuah, et al, 30 J Econ Psych at 742 (cited in note 127).
See note 68 and accompanying text.
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data. As the researchers involved in conducting these cross-cultural
studies concluded, “[f]ailure to recognize the extent of human diversity and the range of processes that have generated the human mosaic[]
may doom large sections of social science to an empirically false and
130
culturally limited construction of human nature.”
III. REALISM VERSUS NATURALISM AND “CORE” OFFENSES
We doubt that naturalists will discover some independent way to
distinguish the core of harms from the periphery, moral transgressions
from conventional, or principles from parameters. But even if there is
some yet-to-be-discovered distinction, naturalists would still face a more
serious problem: there is substantial disagreement about what constitutes
wrongdoing and how serious given offenses are within the so-called
“core” of wrongdoing. As such, the claim that core offenses are noncontroversial requires not only that we ignore disagreement over what constitutes core and noncore offenses, but also that we ignore significant controversies within the three categories of core offenses: “physical aggres131
sion, takings without consent, and deception in exchanges.”
Comparing the abilities of realist and naturalist accounts to manage
both agreement and disagreement over the wrongfulness of physical aggression, takings without consent, and deception in exchanges, however,
requires at least a preliminary account of the realist perspective.
A. Punishment Realism
Punishment Realism, in our account, applies to the study of punishment the insights of classical legal realism and contemporary em132
pirical research into human judgment. Legal realism observes that
abstract concepts, doctrines, and rules of law do not provide unique,
determinate resolutions to most difficult cases, and that in deciding
such cases, legal actors—consciously or not—are necessarily moved by
extralegal influences that shape their choice of one or another of the
various possible justifications and outcomes. For the most part, these
extralegal influences will move legal actors to agree, but sometimes
they will move them to disagree.
Realists just want to know what those extralegal influences are
and how they manifest themselves so that they can better predict legal
outcomes and manipulate policy to enhance whatever social welfare,
130 Henrich, et al, “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective at *45 (cited in note 118).
See also Kelly, et al, 22 Mind & Lang at 117–31 (cited in note 110).
131 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1892 (cited in note 13).
132 See generally Braman and Kahan, Legal Realism as Psychological and Cultural (Not
Political) Realism (cited in note 3).
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fairness, or expressive concern they favor. As such, realists want to
understand the cognitive biases and heuristics that move individuals
133
to interpret law and facts in particular ways. But where the naturalist
account describes highly specific moral intuitions, the realist account
emphasizes the interplay between relatively generic cognitive mechanisms and varied social meanings. On the realist account, cognition is, to
be sure, shaped by a host of demonstrable and perhaps nearly universal cognitive biases and heuristics, many or all of which are the product of evolutionary pressures or accidents. But Punishment Realism, at
least as we conceive of it, views these innate cognitive traits as interacting with and generating a variety of social meanings that ultimately
determine our understanding of and reaction to wrongdoing.
Punishment Realism recognizes that intuitions about wrongdoing
and punishment like these will often seem natural and universal even
when they are, in fact, socially contingent. Perhaps the most obvious
way that individuals come to see their own parochial conceptions of
justice as natural and universal can be described in terms of explicit
value preferences: individuals simply prefer their own value hierar134
chies over those of others. Classic cultural clashes over sodomy,
abortion, slavery, and many other issues are often described in these
terms: participants may recognize that the moral hierarchies of others
vary, but they are unlikely to prize other people’s mores and commitments more highly than their own; at best they may view other value
structures as strange or foreign, at worst as false and debased. And
while those involved in such moral disputes may understand that their
preferred outcomes derive from their values, they will often have
trouble articulating the source of their values. Their values will seem,
135
at least to them, to be natural.

133 There are a number of accounts that might fit this description. For a comparison of the
two main accounts, see Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology in” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging: What
Difference Does It Make?, 92 Marq L Rev 413, 422 (2009).
134 Consider Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture 72–73 (California 1980)
(making the analogous point that private individuals “choose not to be aware of every danger,”
and that when choosing between risks, “subjective values must take priority”).
135 That our values are not universal or transcendental, but historically specific intuitions of
our collective making, is a perspective well described by Stanley Fish:

I intend [the title of the book Doing What Comes Naturally] to refer to the unreflective actions that follow from being embedded in a context of practice. This kind of action . . . is anything but natural in the sense of proceeding independently of historical and social formations; but once those formations are in place (and they always are), what you think to do
will not be calculated in relation to a higher law or an overarching theory but will issue
from you as naturally as breathing.
Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies ix (Duke 1989).
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But the overt privileging of one’s values over those of others often masks a subtler and even more pervasive way that individuals
come to see their own intuitive sense of justice as natural and universal: cultural cognition. Cultural cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to conform their perceptions of risks and their factual beliefs
to their core cultural commitments. It is cognitively easier to believe
factual assertions that comport with our norm-pervaded moral evaluations and cognitively harder to believe those that conflict with or
threaten them.
Numerous studies have shown that culture implicitly shapes factual perceptions in this way, shaping our beliefs without our noticing
that it is doing so. Culture constructs our understandings of fact both
through cognitive mechanisms (such as avoiding cognitive dissonance,
the tendency of individuals to discount information that conflicts with
their existing beliefs and values) and social practices (such as selecting
information sources like favored news outlets and friends who share
our values). Individuals with varied and durable conceptions of what
is noble and what is base thus form equally varied and durable conceptions about what is true and what is false. As a result, even where
individuals are willing to agree to a single legal standard that requires
specific factual findings (as jurors must), a host of cognitive biases and
heuristics can move them to conform their understanding of relevant
facts so that they arrive at varied appraisals of wrongfulness.
These two forms of cultural influence—one explicit and one implicit—are often mutually reinforcing. Because individuals tend to
credit factual claims that are consistent with their normative visions of
a just social order, when they reflect on their cultural commitments
they have plenty of facts to suggest that their worldview is naturally
preferable to others. And, because their cultural commitments will
seem naturally preferable to them, they are less likely to question
these commitments or their influence on their factual perceptions.
We have more to say below about Punishment Realism and the
various social and cognitive mechanisms that sustain it, but with that
brief summary in hand, we turn to crimes within the so-called “core of
wrongdoing.”
B.

The Core Offenses

There are recurrent themes in the kinds of acts that are prohibited in many cultures. Robinson and Kurzban have helpfully collected them under the rubrics of “aggression, takings without consent,
and deception in exchange,” and argue that acts falling into these categories constitute “the core of wrongdoing.” As we argue below, none
of these categories is composed of acts free from dissensus, and the nature of the systematic dissensus that pervades each of these categories is
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at least as interesting and informative as any agreement that can be
found. We start with “takings without consent” and “deception in exchange,” two easy cases. Then we take on rape, followed by the hardest
case—the core of the core of wrongdoing, so to speak—murder,
around which we develop our argument in greater detail.
1. Takings without consent.
The anecdote at the beginning of this Article provides some measure of the problems faced by naturalist claims about a universal or
normal intuition regarding takings without consent. A substantial part
of the dissensus over takings relates to varied conceptions of property.
As the anthropologists Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, and Melanie Wiber describe, the concept of property can
be thought of as depending on three variable concepts: “rst, the social
units (individuals, groups, lineages, corporations, states) that can hold
property rights and obligations; second, the construction of valuables as
property objects; and third, the different sets of rights and obligations
136
social units can have with respect to such objects.”
As we noted in the Introduction, even where everyone is in
agreement on the idea that someone owns something of value—a train
ticket, for example—that individual’s rights and obligations can vary
dramatically from context to context. In the United States, we typically have highly individualistic conceptions of rights and obligations—at
least relative to those living in India and Papua New Guinea. As a
result, an act that would be considered an invasion of some propertylike right in one time or place can seem perfectly normal in another
because the norms governing who has access to what and under which
conditions vary so dramatically across time and place.
The anthropological literature on non-Western cultures provides
137
ample illustration of this, but we need look no further than recent

136 Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, and Melanie G. Wiber, The
Properties of Property, in Franz Benda-Beckman, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, and Melanie G.
Wiber, eds, Changing Properties of Property 1, 15 (Berghahn 2006).
137 Anthropologists have come to view the notion of property as often contested:

[P]eople have at any given moment a number of “languages” available to them for characterizing objects in circulation as commodified, gift-like, inalienable, and so on. These languages are often in tension; actors also have differential access to them. And they use these
languages within a context that may constrain the use of some idioms and support the use
of others. This perspective . . . helps us understand how multiple or hybrid forms of value
occur simultaneously.
Elizabeth Emma Ferry, Not Ours Alone: Patrimony, Value, and Collectivity in Contemporary Mexico
18 (Columbia 2005). David Graeber and Maurice Godelier provide two recent and influential
general accounts of the way value and property vary across time and place. See generally David
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domestic debates (over, for example, the law of taxation, in which the
ownership of a good that is highly valued—money—is continually
138
139
contested; or eminent domain, adverse possession, nuisance, or intellectual property, on which the members of the public, the academy,
and the bench regularly disagree) to get a flavor of the sticky dissen140
sus over “takings without consent” closer to home.
It is no help to modify the naturalist account by suggesting that, although the idea of property varies, the notion does not vary that transgressions of those rights are intuitively wrong. Without providing content to the rights themselves, this simply passes along the cognitive puzzle of what is wrongful to local norms governing what exactly it is that
comprises a property right. This is not to say that there may not be some
very general traits that humans share with respect to affection for vari141
ous possessions. The question is whether we have universal intuitions
about when an act is theft and, if so, how wrongful it is relative to other
acts. And that is something that simply cannot be resolved without reference to variable social norms.
This is a modified version of Jerry Fodor’s “input problem” for
evolutionary theories that rely on multiple cognitive modules of this
142
sort. If the argument is that we have a module that helps us quickly
compute a judgment such as “theft is wrong,” we need to have some
sense of when something qualifies as theft. But the definition of theft
(or fraud or murder) is fairly complex and socially contingent in evolutionary contexts, depending on social groups, status, and a host of
other concerns. Because you need complex social information to assess whether something is theft, you have not really bought any cognitive efficiency with a module that tells you that theft is wrong, because

Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams (Palgrave 2001); Maurice Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift (Chicago 1999) (Nora Scott, trans).
138 Compare, for example, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership 8
(Oxford 2002) (arguing that private property is a legal convention defined in part by the tax
system) with Stephen Moore, In Their Own Words, Natl Rev Online (Apr 23, 2002), online at
http://www.nationalreview.com/moore/moore042302.asp (visited May 1, 2010) (critiquing Murphy and Nagel’s book).
139 As Janice Nadler and Shari Diamond have found in their research, variable concepts
like “subjective attachment to property” are paramount in shaping “the perceived justice of a
taking.” Janice Nadler and Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of
Property Rights, Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J Empirical Legal
Stud 713, 713 (2009). See also, for example, Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469 (2005),
which provoked public debate over property rights and takings without consent.
140 Special thanks to Stephanie Stern for making this point to us.
141 See, for example, Richard C. Stedman, Toward a Social Psychology of Place, 34 Envir &
Behav 561, 563 (2002).
142 See Jerry Fodor, The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way 71–78 (MIT 2000) (describing the
input problem).
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the same complex social information that tells you that something is
theft can also tell you that it is wrong and how wrong it is.
It is, of course, possible to move away from specifics and develop
general rules on which people agree. But such definitions invariably
depend on some variable notion of what makes something wrongful.
Taking without consent and deception in exchange are thus not always
wrong; rather, they are wrong when social customs tell us so.
2. Deception in exchange.
If ever there was a messy and discordant conception in law and
morality, it is that governing “deception in exchange.” Punishment
Naturalists assert that deception in exchange is one of the core areas
of agreement in our moral development. They suggest that the moral
norm against deception arises because of the “analogical closeness to
inflicting direct personal harm on another” or because it is an “ex143
tremely useful mechanism for a society to develop”: intuitions like
144
these enable cooperation because they punish defectors and cheats.
We agree that across societies, individuals exhibit a general (and
widely shared) dislike of shirking and fraud. The positive version of
145
this dislike is instantiated in the norm of reciprocity. But that general
principle falls apart at the level of specificity at which the law typically
operates. Individuals, it turns out, have quite divergent views about
whether specific kinds of lying are wrongful, and how far the law
ought to go to protect buyers in commercial exchanges from their own
bad judgment in relying on a seller’s speech. Because these are the
live issues in the criminal regulation of deception, we briefly explore
such divergent views here.
Consider first the definitional problem. For example, judges commonly take from the jury actions for civil or criminal fraud in sale of
146
goods cases where the seller has “puffed” her goods. This alone suggests that the general principle “do not lie in commercial exchange” has

143

Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 58–59 (cited in note 15).
Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1647–49 (cited in note 14).
145 See generally Kathleen D. Vohs, Roy F. Baumeister, and Jason Chin, Feeling Duped:
Emotional, Motivational, and Cognitive Aspects of Being Exploited by Others, 11 Rev Gen Psych
127 (2007); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 Mich
L Rev 71 (2003).
146 Many of the issues in puffery, such as questions of falsifiability in false advertising cases,
are often resolved as matters of law rather than fact. See Jean W. Burns, Confused Jurisprudence:
False Advertising under the Lanham Act, 79 BU L Rev 807, 867–71 (1999); Ivan L. Preston, The
Definition of Deceptiveness in Advertising and Other Commercial Speech, 39 Cath U L Rev 1035,
1040–41 (1990).
144
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147

a variety of concrete meanings. The Supreme Court itself has advanced distinct—and often competing—definitions of what the term
148
“misleading” means. Both jurists and lay people simply do not have
stable preferences about what constitutes “deception.” Instead, their
views about whether speech in fact deceives turn on their implicit
views of whether it should.
One might be tempted to believe that these various rules on the
meaning of deception turn on a general empirical finding that individuals do not believe sales talk. But, as a number of studies have found,
149
“puffery is believed by large numbers of consumers,” though not
150
all. In this way, the law of fraud is full of conflicts over values—do we
want individuals to bear the responsibility for their own choices, or do
we want individuals to recognize context and market power as important—masquerading as disputes about fact. That dissensus in turn
produces the hotly disputed political fights regarding the law of deception in exchange we see all around us, including the scope of the
securities laws and the appropriateness of most forms of consumer
protection regulation.

147 See David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 Iowa L Rev 1395, 1400–16
(2006) (defining the puffery defense in false advertising, securities, UCC warranty, and promissory estoppel cases). See also Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and Other “Loophole” Claims: How the
Law’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity in Advertising, 18 J L & Commerce 49, 54–55 (1998) (noting that puffery may take a variety of forms, including claims that a
product is the “best,” “best possible,” “better,” and “specially good”). Hoffman provides a host of
instances where intuitions vary on seemingly similar cases:

Advil’s claim that it, “like Tylenol,” “doesn’t upset the stomach” was found not to be immune
puffery because a court believed that consumers would have viewed the statements to be a
factual comparison with other brands. Similarly, a motor-oil company’s claim to provide “longer engine life and better engine protection” was not held to be puffery. By contrast, a puffery
defense succeeded with respect to Bayer’s statement that it made the “the world’s best aspirin” that “works wonders.” And a videogame manufacturer escaped liability, despite claiming
to have made “The Most Advanced Home Gaming System in the Universe.” . . .
The claim that yogurt is “nature’s perfect food” apparently may be falsified and is not puffery.
But, to enthusiasts’ chagrin, Nestlé’s boast that it sells the “very best chocolate” is a meaningless puff. If, upon eating too much chocolate yogurt, one needed a diet, the makers of topical
gel could be liable for claiming to “dramatically interfere with the process of converting calories to fat” and “inhibit the creation of new fat cells.” But, the makers of a weight-loss pill
trumpeting the drug’s ability to cause you to “Lose Weight Fast” would be protected.
Hoffman, 91 Iowa L Rev at 1404 (alterations omitted).
148 See generally Hoffman, 91 Iowa L Rev 1395 (cited in note 147), Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L Rev 1 (2000).
149 Perry Haan and Cal Berkey, A Study of the Believability of the Forms of Puffery, 8 J
Marketing Comm 243, 246 (2002) (citing studies).
150 See Hoffman, 91 Iowa L Rev at 1442 (cited in note 147).
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Thus, while it may be “intuitively easy to make the connection be151
tween physically taking property and physically harming another,”
the category of “deception in exchange” lacks legal coherence. Rather,
some kinds of deception, in certain circumstances, are actionable and
morally wrongful. Sometimes, violators of the “norm” of reciprocity
are held to be legally responsible by most of the population, sometimes by only part of the population, and sometimes by only a small
152
minority. The contingency of the finding turns on individuals’ views
of what we owe to one another as citizens, the degree to which individuals should be responsible for their own flourishing or should turn
to social systems for protection, and the amount of freedom we ought
to permit speakers to falsely extol or mislead by omission.
3. Rape.
The law of rape has been a site of intense legal and political conflict for over thirty years, and “date” or “acquaintance rape” has been
153
at the center of that dispute. In particular, those involved in the debate disagree over how the law should deal with cases in which a
woman engages in “verbal resistance”—that is, says “no”—but does
not display the form or quantum of “physical resistance” demanded
154
by the traditional, common law definition of rape. Arguing that the
law’s resistance to convicting in such cases leaves women unprotected
from one especially common form of coerced sex, feminist and other
reformers have successfully attained a variety of reforms. All jurisdictions have now adopted evidentiary rules that prohibit proof of a
complainant’s “sexual history” designed to show a propensity to con155
sent. Some, but not others, have modified elements of the traditional
common law definition of rape, such as elimination of the “force or
threat of force” element or the reasonable mistake of fact defense
151 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 58–59 (cited in note 15) (arguing for the “analogical closeness” of these categories).
152 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Efficient Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 Mich L Rev 633, 654–64 (2010) (demonstrating that individuals’
feelings of moral loss associated with contractual breach can be ameliorated by private law side
agreements). See also Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63
Vand L Rev 1003, 1022–33 (2010) (demonstrating that individuals’ perceptions of loss of status
due to breaches of reciprocity could be manipulated in various contractual scenarios).
153 See generally Susan Caringella, Addressing Rape Reform in Law and Practice 12–17
(Columbia 2009); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the
Failure of Law 29–46 (Harvard 1998).
154 Compare, for example, Estrich, Real Rape at 102–03 (cited in note 9) (arguing for a “no
means no” standard in the law) with D.N. Husak and G.C. Thomas, Date Rape, Social Convention,
and Reasonable Mistakes, 11 L & Phil 95, 122–25 (1992) (arguing against a standard that treats a
verbal “no” as sufficient).
155 See, for example, FRE 412.
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relating to consent, aimed at forcing judges and jurors to treat “no” as
156
“no” for purposes of rape law. These reforms, however, seem to have
157
had little impact in practice and continue to generate scholarly and
158
political debate.
Punishment Naturalists have voiced skepticism, if not hostility,
toward such reform efforts. They identify the imposition of “[s]trict
liability in cases where culpability may be difficult to prove, but is likely to exist” as an ill-considered departure from what are asserted to be
159
shared intuitions. Among “the reform programs” that they identify
as involving “criminal law manipulation . . . to alter people’s intuitions
of justice” is the “attempt[] to eradicate the notion that women often
pretend to withhold consent to intercourse to appear more alluring or
simply to avoid appearing ‘promiscuous,’ rather than as a genuine in160
dication of not wanting to engage in sexual activity.” But nothing in
their carefully conducted empirical studies of shared intuitions in fact
supports the sort of conservative stance toward reform efforts that
these comments imply.
The Punishment Naturalists conclude that rape is among the
“core” forms of “wrongdoing” that are “the subject of nuanced and spe161
cific intuitions that cut across demographics.” The evidence consists of
multiple studies showing that demographically diverse individuals are
highly likely to agree that “rape” should be punished and is a more “se162
rious” form of wrongdoing than various other offenses. The Punishment Naturalists have themselves found that subjects tend to regard
163
“rape” as more serious than imposition of mere “unwanted sex.”
It is simply not possible to derive from this evidence any reason
to be skeptical, much less any reason to oppose, date-rape reform efforts. There might well be “consensus” that rape should be punished
and is “worse” than inducing another to engage in “unwanted sex.”
But there most manifestly is not consensus in American society on
how “rape” should be defined, and in particular whether a man who
engages in sex with a woman who repeatedly tells him “no” before and
during intercourse has committed “rape” or merely succeeded in
achieving “unwanted sex,” or over how severely, if at all, to punish such
156

See, for example, Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex at 30–33 (cited in note 153).
See generally Jody Clay-Warner and Callie Harbin Burt, Rape Reporting after Reforms:
Have Times Really Changed?, 11 Violence Against Women 150 (2005).
158 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and
Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U Pa L Rev 729 (2010).
159 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 46–47 (cited in note 15).
160 Id at 52.
161 Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1892 (cited in note 13).
162 See id at 1853 & n 100, 1856 & n 123, 1859 & nn 135, 138.
163 See id at 1885–88.
157
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a man. Indeed, the Punishment Naturalists themselves have reported
finding less consensus surrounding whether and how much to punish
“unwanted sex,” presumably because people do disagree about whether
164
it should be regarded as a crime, and, if so, as serious a crime as rape.
The source of that disagreement is cultural. Psychologists and sociologists specializing in women’s studies have shown that disagreements over a host of beliefs and attitudes toward rape correlate with
competing sets of moral norms—one that is “hierarchical” in nature
and prescribes highly stratified gender roles, and another that is more
“egalitarian” and rejects the proposition of separate male and female
165
spheres in society. A recent mock-juror study conducted by the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School found that the outlooks
individuals subscribed to predicted high levels of disagreement over
whether a man should be found guilty of rape in a case patterned on
166
Commonwealth v Berkowitz, a “no means yes” acquaintance rape
case that provoked intense political controversy in the 1990s and that
continues to be featured in scholarly commentary. The disagreement
among ordinary citizens over such cases can be linked to a form of
cultural status competition insofar as both hierarchical and egalitarian
individuals perceive that the stance the law adopts on this issue will
align it with the norms of one or the other cultural group. Indeed, the
group most resistant to and resentful of reform of the common law of
rape, the study found, consisted of hierarchical women (particularly
older ones), whose high social status is most conspicuously tied to continued public endorsement of the traditional, but not bitterly con167
tested, norms of sexuality.
This controversy is fraught with difficult issues. Should the law
weigh in on the side of those who want to make “no” mean “no” for
purposes of rape law as a means of promoting egalitarian norms? Or
would that be an inappropriately partisan and illiberal application of
law to promote a moral and cultural orthodoxy? Alternatively, if the
law resists demands for change, is it not siding with the hierarchical position, effectively endorsing that position’s understanding of idealized
gender norms? If the law is to be made to take a side in this debate, how
can it do so effectively? If it wants to be genuinely neutral, what stance
would effectively communicate that intention? These questions cannot
even be framed intelligibly, much less answered satisfactorily, by any
164

See id at 1890–91 & n 230.
See, for example, Michael W. Wiederman, The Gendered Nature of Sexual Scripts, 13 Fam
J 496, 499 (2005); Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J Personality & Soc
Psych 217, 225 (1980).
166 641 A2d 1161 (Pa 1994).
167 See Kahan, 158 U Pa L Rev at 734 (cited in note 158).
165
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theoretical framework of criminal law that insists on confining its attention to issues on which there is “consensus”—issues that are peripheral
to urgent, pressing debate whether or not they might be said to be at
the “core” of a set of “shared intuitions.”
Indeed, a framework that fails to acknowledge or recognize that
it is addressing issues at the practical and political periphery of criminal law can easily generate unreliable explanations and prescriptions.
One Punishment Naturalist, Owen Jones, posits (on the basis of extrapolation from sociobiological theory) differences in “male and female
brains” that cause them to “process rape victimization differently,”
with the latter predisposed to take it much more seriously because of
the impact it had in disrupting “female mate choice in ancestral envi168
ronments.” Jones surmises (on the basis of further conjecture) that
these ingrained biological differences are the likely source of the inefficacy of rape law reforms and identifies (without necessarily endorsing) various reforms aimed at making the biological foundations for
male–female disagreements manifest, thus promoting greater resolve
on the part of the legal system to convict rapists and punish them
169
more severely.
As fascinating and insightful as it is, this account will not be of
much use to anyone earnestly engaged in trying to understand and
promote morally appropriate solutions to the existing debate over
rape law reform. The one feature of this account that admits of empirical examination—its assertion that the inefficacy of rape-reform laws
stems from male and female differences over the seriousness of rape
victimization—is contrary to all the available evidence. Indeed, without (as far as we know) following any of Jones’s strategies for remedying a deficiency in how seriously men take the harm of rape, the law
has made progress in reducing the incidence of violent stranger rape
comparable in degree to the progress it has made in reducing many
170
other forms of common crimes, including homicide, in recent decades.
The form of rape that apparently has evaded reduction is exactly the
type—date or acquaintance rape—at which the “no means no” re171
forms have been directed. As explained, the force that has limited
168 See Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and
Prevention, 87 Cal L Rev 827, 917 (1999).
169 See id at 917–20.
170 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Key Facts at a Glance: National Crime Victimization
Survey Violent Crime Trends, 1973–2008, online at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/
viortrdtab.cfm (visited Oct 22, 2010) (reporting a drop in the incidence of rape from 2.8 per 1,000
to 0.4 per 1,000 between 1979 and 2004).
171 Clay-Warner and Burt, 11 Violence Against Women at 167 (cited in note 157) (concluding that the incidence of reporting of “simple” or acquaintance rape, as opposed to “aggravated”
or stranger rape, has not changed since the 1970s).
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those reforms is not biological but cultural. The conflict here is not
one originating (in brains, genes, or anything else) between men and
women; it is between men and women of one cultural outlook and
men and women of another. Indeed, the group with the narrowest apprehension of what “rape” is—the one most likely to see “no” as
meaning “yes”—consists of hierarchical women. What reason is there
for supposing that “contextualizing women’s emotional reactions to
172
rape within the evolutionary processes” would help make them more
likely as citizens to support rape law reform or to vote as jurors to
convict under reform statutes once they are enacted?
Indeed, far from helping to advance the cause of those who want
to reduce the incidence of acquaintance rape, Jones’s attempt to derive
guidance from the (conjectured) sociobiological differences in men’s
and women’s apprehensions of the harm of rape are more likely to obstruct it. Jones, for example, argues against the enactment of “sexual
assault” statutes, apparently unaware of the role that such statutes are
intended to play in norm reform: calling nonconsensual sex that is unaccompanied by force or threat of force “sexual assault” is less likely to
trigger resistance to punishing forms of “unwanted sex” that some men
and women condemn but do not regard as “rape”; and by assuring at
least some degree of punishment for such behavior now, such statutes
make it more likely that in the future more men and women will join
the ranks of those who already regard such behavior as “rape” and who
173
see it as meriting designation and punishment as such. How successful
this strategy has been, and whether it is otherwise morally appropriate,
174
are matters of reasonable debate. But the only arguments that will
contribute meaningfully to that discussion are the ones that come to
grips, in an empirically informed way, with the real cultural differences
in individuals’ understandings of what “rape” is.
Perhaps naturalists’ conceptions of takings without consent, deception in exchange, and rape are complicated in these ways because
these offenses are less central to the naturalist conception of “the core
of wrongdoing” than offenses involving the most serious form of physical aggression: killing. In what follows, we focus on the most serious of
wrongdoings in this class: murder. If naturalism is to prevail anywhere,
surely it should be with the most serious crimes in our legal repertoire.175

172

See Jones, 87 Cal L Rev at 918 (cited in note 168).
See Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex at 104–05 (cited in note 153); Kahan, 158 U Pa L Rev at
752 (cited in note 158).
174 See Kahan, 158 U Pa L Rev at 752–53 (cited in note 158).
175 Naturalists themselves agree with this prioritization of violence over other wrongs. See,
for example, Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1635 n 5 (cited in note 14).
173
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4. Murder.
Punishment Naturalism holds that people agree both on what
constitutes murder and on how serious a given murder is relative to
other potentially bad acts. Punishment Realism, in contrast, holds that
while people agree on many cases (for example, the heinous kidnap176
ping-torture-murder case described above ), they also frequently disagree about both whether an act is so wrong as to be criminal and, if it
is, how serious the criminal offense is.
a) Ambiguous agreement. Take, as an example, Robinson and
Kurzban’s study showing that people generally agree that the killer in
the first of the following vignettes is guilty and should be punished
while the killer in the second is innocent and should not:
SCENARIO A: John knows the address of a woman who has highly offended him. As he had planned the day before, he waits
there for the woman to return from work and, when she appears,
177
John shoots her to death.
SCENARIO B: John is knocked down from behind by a man with
a knife who moves to stab him. As the man lunges for him, John
stabs him with a piece of glass he finds on the ground, which is
the only thing he can do to save himself from being killed. The
178
man later dies of his injuries.
We do not doubt that there is little disagreement over either claim
in cases like these in the contemporary United States. Most people will
define the former as a crime and the latter as not a crime; and even
where they do believe the latter to be a crime, they consistently rank it
as less serious than the former. But what underlies this consistency?
Naturalism and realism both furnish explanations for this agreement. The naturalist explanation features evolutionary pressures: if we
did not agree on the wrongfulness of taking human life, our existence
would be—at least relatively speaking—nasty, brutish, and short. Collectively, then, humans who intuitively viewed this kind of aggression
as wrong and deserving of punishment were more likely to survive as
a group; those who did not were less likely to survive. The result was a
179
gradual growth of human sociality; but this sociality should be
thought of not as an agreement or an implicit norm to which people

176

See text accompanying note 36.
Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1897 (cited in note 13).
178 Id at 1894.
179 See Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1646–54 (cited in note 14) (arguing
that human social impulses laid the foundation for a predisposition to acquire shared intuitions
of justice, which provided evolutionary benefits to the individuals bearing them).
177
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are acculturated, but as a modest but ever increasing biological disposition to view these acts as wrong and deserving punishment.
Realism, by contrast, explains this agreement as the product of
shared social meaning, an agreement deriving from cultural norms
that are widely shared in our society. While both scenarios are quite
vague, they provide enough for readers to form a picture of the defendant in each case and to evaluate, relative to socially constructed
norms, the moral quality of each act. On this account, the impulse to
view the first act as wrong and the second as innocent stems not from
an innate moral organ, but rather from shared socialization. This does
not mean that there are not innate cognitive mechanisms at work, but
rather that they are quite general and allow for the construction of
social meanings that may vary substantially. Nor does it mean that
humans will necessarily disagree: if they are similarly socialized, then
they will in all probability evaluate the social meaning of these acts in
similar ways.
Both accounts fully explain the lack of variation found by Robinson and Kurzban on this item. And, if humans always agreed on what
distinguishes a good from a bad killing, it would be impossible to figure out which of the two accounts furnishes a better explanation of
the available data. To distinguish between the two accounts, then, we
have to alter the scenarios such that the social meaning of an act is in
dispute. We could then see if variations in cultural outlooks explained
variations in appraisals of guilt.
In what follows, we do that. We look first at examples in which
there are explicit disagreements over which standards should govern
what constitutes a serious wrong. We then look at instances in which,
even where individuals accept a single standard, they disagree over
which acts meet the standard.
b) Disagreement over standards. One way to evaluate these two
accounts is to ask whether there have been cultural regimes in which
the meaning of these acts varied. History, as it happens, furnishes
180
many such examples; we describe just a few.
While the contemporary formulation of self-defense doctrine addresses persons in universal terms, supplying a unitary standard that
makes no reference to the social identities of the persons entitled to use
181
deadly force or those against whom they are entitled to use it, this was
180

These are drawn from Kahan and Braman, 45 Am Crim L Rev at 3 n 2 (cited in note 34).
The traditional standard is couched in terms that are reflected in nearly every jurisdiction in the United States today: a person who has not otherwise provoked aggression is entitled
to resort to deadly force against another (and hence is protected from criminal liability for doing
so) when she honestly and reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to herself. See Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Substantive Criminal
181
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not always the case. Historically, many societies conditioned the use of
182
deadly force in self-defense on membership in a privileged class.
One need not leave the United States to find such contentious
social meanings: the law in the antebellum American South also made
such distinctions, denying blacks the authority to use deadly force to
protect themselves from deadly assaults by whites and affording
whites greater authority to use deadly force against blacks than
183
against fellow whites. As Justice William Brennan noted in his fam184
ous dissent in McCleskey v Kemp, during the colonial period, “black
slaves who killed whites in Georgia, regardless of whether in selfdefense or in defense of another, were automatically executed,” but “a
person who willfully murdered a slave was not punished until the
second offense, and then was responsible simply for restitution to the
185
slave owner.”
What would members of that historical moment have made of the
following vignettes?
MODIFIED SCENARIO A: John owns a slave who has highly offended him. As he had planned the day before, he waits for his
slave to return from work and, when he appears, John shoots him
to death.
MODIFIED SCENARIO B: Joe, a slave, is knocked down from behind by his owner, John, who moves to stab him. As John lunges
for him, Joe stabs him with a piece of glass he finds on the
ground, which is the only thing he can do to save himself from
being killed. John later dies of his injuries.
While it would be hard for naturalists to account for the distinctive
understandings of these vignettes in colonial and contemporary
American communities, realism offers a straightforward explanation
for the observed variation. A realist account would describe the
Law § 10.4(b) at 145–47 (West 2d ed 2003). If the threat is of some lesser magnitude, a person
may repel it only with nonlethal force. See id.
182 See generally David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant, and Joanne D. Eisen, The Human Right of
Self-Defense, 22 BYU J Pub L 43, 104–13 (2008) (describing which classes were able to use selfdefense under Greek, Jewish, and Roman law).
183 See, for example, A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr and Anne F. Jacobs, The “Law Only as an
Enemy”: The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 NC L Rev 969, 1042 (1992):
Despite the unrelenting punishments and beatings that a slave might receive at the hands of
an overseer, an owner, or another white, there were only rare instances in which a slave
might claim self-defense in the killing of a white person. Such cases generally involved
whites of low socioeconomic background.
184

481 US 279 (1987).
Id at 329 & n 8 (Brennan dissenting), citing A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr, In the Matter of
Color: Race in the American Legal Process: The Colonial Period 253, 254 & n 90, 256 (Oxford 1978).
185
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changing importance of social status within colonial and contemporary American society and the various rights and duties (or lack thereof) that accompanied status. Within a society that embraces such status distinctions, the social meaning of aggression by someone of stature and rank against a subaltern was distinct from the meaning of
186
aggression by the subaltern against a person of status.
Again, even if we limit our scope to the United States, it is well
known that tolerance of the use of deadly force to protect various
nonvital interests has varied significantly across time and place. Marks
of social status, such as displays of deference in public space and male
dominion over the sexual lives of wives and daughters in particular,
are a conspicuous characteristic of communities guided by honor
187
norms. For example, in many Southern jurisdictions in the United
States, it was once the case that the paramour could not “lawfully defend himself against the husband’s violence, and stand his ground and
188
shoot or cut in order to repel the husband’s attack upon him.” Again,
we can modify the vignettes slightly to alter their social meaning in
this historical context:
MODIFIED SCENARIO A: John knows the address of a man, Tom,
who has offended him by implying he had sex with his wife. As he
had planned the day before, he waits there for Tom to return
from work and, when he appears, John confronts him and shoots
him to death.
MODIFIED SCENARIO B: After implying he had sex with John’s
wife, Tom is knocked down from behind by John who moves to
stab him with a knife. As John lunges for him, Tom stabs him with
a piece of glass he finds on the floor, which is the only thing he can
do to save himself from being killed. John later dies of his injuries.
In considering how varied the evaluations of these vignettes might
be, consider the experiments conducted by Richard Nisbett and Dov

186 Similar status hierarchies can be found in many societies. Consider, for example, the Tokugawa administrative code in feudal Japan that granted Samurai the privilege of “kiri-sute-gomen,
that is the privilege of a samurai to cut down a commoner with impunity.” E. Herbert Norman,
Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period 18 (Institute of Pacific Relations 1940). See also David B. Kopel, The Samurai, the Mountie, and the Cowboy: Should America Adopt the Gun Controls of Other Democracies? 30 (Prometheus 1992) (“Any
disrespectful member of the lower class could be executed by a Samurai’s sword.”).
187 See Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in
the South 32 (Westview 1996) (arguing that the culture of the South included a tolerance for the use
of violence for the protection of vital as well as what would now be considered nonvital interests).
188 William M. McKinney and Burdett A. Rich, eds, 13 Ruling Case Law 834 (Thompson
1916), citing Dabney v State, 21 So 211, 211–12 (Ala 1897); Drysdale v State, 10 SE 358, 358
(Ga 1889).
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Cohen discussing honor norms that govern interactions like these in
189
the contemporary United States.
In one particularly revealing study, Nisbett and Cohen told participants about a man named Fred and asked how justified Fred would
be in fighting an acquaintance who had affronted him in some way.
The first set of questions asked respondents how justified physical
aggression would be if it were in response to another man who “looks
over Fred’s girlfriend and starts talking to her in a suggestive way,”
“insults Fred’s wife, implying that she has loose morals,” or “tells others behind Fred’s back that Fred is a liar and a cheat.” In a second set
of questions, they asked whether Fred would be justified in shooting
190
the person who had committed certain “more serious affronts.”
A summary of the results are provided below in Figure 3. Across
all the questions, Southerners were more likely to suggest that a violent response was “extremely justified” and that Fred would not be
191
“much of a man” if he did not respond violently.
FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF SOUTHERNERS AND MIDWESTERNERS
192
APPROVING OF A VIOLENT RESPONSE TO VARIOUS SCENARIOS

189
190
191
192

Nisbett and Cohen, Culture of Honor at 31 (cited in note 187).
Id.
Id.
Id at 32.
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Nisbett and Cohen reason that the regional variation they see in
the responses reflects differences in local norms regarding what constitutes appropriately masculine behavior. “Fighting to answer an affront is part of the masculine ideal for southerners in a way it is not
for midwesterners,” but this difference “was not due simply to midwesterners’ being more nonviolent generally. When questions were
asked about men who fight when there has been no affront, midwesterners and southerners gave the same assessment of the men” as fit193
ting “poorly” with their “definition of manhood.”
Dov Cohen, Richard Nisbett, Brian Bowdle, and Norbert
Schwartz expanded on these studies in a series of ingenious “ethno194
graphic experiments.” Participants were selected for having grown
up in either the North or South. All participants had to pass a (large,
6 3 , 250 lbs) confederate of the researchers in a narrow hallway
where there was only room for one person to walk comfortably. The
new confederate walked down the center of the hall on a collision
course with the participant and did not move (except at the last
195
second to avoid bumping into the participants).
Members of one group, after making their way past this single
confederate, were exposed to a battery of tests, including tests for cortisol and testosterone levels, and were asked to self-assess their masculinity. Members of the other group were exposed to the same stimuli
with one addition: prior to passing the large confederate in the hallway, they were insulted by a different confederate who bumped into
196
each participant and called him an “asshole.” While the differences
between Northern and Southern groups who were not bumped were
insignificant, the differences between regional groups who were
bumped were remarkable.
As the researchers described their findings (and as displayed in
Figures 4 through 7 below), compared to Northerners, insulted Southerners were “more likely to think their masculine reputation was
threatened,” “more upset (as shown by . . . cortisol levels),” “more physiologically primed for aggression (as shown by . . . testosterone levels),”
“more cognitively primed for aggression,” and “more likely to engage in
aggressive and dominant behavior” (as indicated by their unwillingness
197
to back down when encountering the second confederate).

193

Nisbett and Cohen, Culture of Honor at 31 (cited in note 187).
See generally Dov Cohen, et al, Insult, Aggression, and the Southern Culture of Honor:
An “Experimental Ethnography,” 70 J Personality & Soc Psych 945, 945 (1996).
195 Id at 948, 950, 953.
196 Id at 948.
197 Id at 945.
194
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FIGURES 4 AND 5. CHANGES IN CORTISOL AND TESTOSTERONE
LEVELS FOR INSULTED AND NON-INSULTED SOUTHERNERS
198
AND NORTHERNERS

FIGURES 6 AND 7. DIFFERENCES IN WILLINGNESS TO BACK DOWN
199
AND SELF-PERCEPTIONS OF MASCULINITY

The researchers conclude that Southern culture supplies a social
meaning to physical aggression and status that is distinct from that

198
199

Cohen, et al, 70 J Personality & Soc Psych at 952 (cited in note 194).
Id at 954, 956.
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supplied by Northern culture. Southerners are more likely to view insults as diminishing a man’s status, and Southern males are more likely
200
to attempt to restore lost status through aggressive or violent behavior.
Clearly, our argument here is not against biology or natural selection for cognitive mechanisms that underwrite intuitions about the
wrongfulness of violent acts of aggression. Individuals, on this account,
do have rapid, intuitive, emotional responses fed by cognitive and biological mechanisms that have emerged over the course of human evolution; but those responses, while partially driven by physiological and
201
biochemical responses, are dependent on the social meaning of the
acts that precede them rather than a discrete moral module within the
brain. Social norms, as these researchers describe, shape what individuals view as untoward behavior and what individuals consider appropriate responses to that behavior.
c) Disagreements over which acts meet a given standard. The examples above illustrate divergent standards governing behavior and
appropriate responses to perceived wrongs, and one can easily imagine those evaluating the acts describing their disagreements in terms
of explicit value differences and self-consciously norm-inflected morality. But as we mentioned above, cultural cognition will often produce subtler forms of dissensus that reflect the implicit influence of
our diverse cultural commitments in the face of a single standard.
Thus, even when individuals agree on a legal or moral standard to be
employed, they may disagree vehemently over whether those standards have been met. That is, they may disagree about the facts as
much as—or more than—they disagree about the law.
By way of illustration, we describe two examples from a series of
large-scale experiments that we conducted and that are reported in
202
greater detail elsewhere. In each, we asked members of the public to
serve as mock jurors on a case, and in each case participants were
asked to make factual findings and determine guilt.

200 Id at 956–57. There are evolutionary explanations that we do not evaluate here. See, for example, Todd K. Shackelford, An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective on Cultures of Honor, 3 Evol
Psych 381, 389 (2005) (arguing that these results can be explained via evolutionary psychology).
201 Pain often generates responses that are similar to those stemming from a perceived
social threat, even when the pain is internal to, and completely independent of, the social circumstances. See Raymond W. Novaco, Anger, in Alan E. Kazdin, ed, 1 Encyclopedia of Psychology 170, 171 (Oxford 2000).
202 See Kahan and Braman, 45 Am Crim L Rev at 21–49 (cited in note 34) (detailing “neutral umpire,” “political partisanship,” and “self-defensive cognition” models of evaluating selfdefense evidence).
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The first, modeled on the facts of the Bernard Goetz case, featured a slight white man who shot a larger black youth after the youth
demanded, “Give me five dollars.” The defendant had been mugged
twice before and claimed that this time, based on past experience, he
knew that his victim was about to seriously hurt him. He also claimed,
and an expert witness avowed, that as a result of his prior muggings he
suffered from posttraumatic stress syndrome. Participants were asked
to read the following summary of the facts before making any factual
findings or rendering a verdict:
George is charged with murdering Alvin.
George (a 48-year-old white male; 5 7 , 142 lbs.) fatally shot Alvin (a 17-year-old African American male; 6 2 , 215 lbs.) after
Alvin stated “give me some money, man.” The shooting occurred
on a city subway platform at 5:30 p.m. on a weekday evening. After shooting Alvin, George fled but turned himself in to police
three hours later.
George had been mugged on three previous occasions. On one of
these, he had been beaten and required fifteen stitches under his
eye. George had reported the robberies, each of which had been
committed by persons George described as “teen aged, African
American males,” but police failed to make any arrests. George
bought the handgun used in the shooting after the third mugging.
Testifying in his own defense, George told the jury that, although
he’d never seen Alvin before, George “could tell from his body
language and the aggressive tone of his voice” that Alvin was
“going to mess with me.” “It was exactly like the other time I had
been attacked,” George stated. “I felt I had no choice but to
shoot him,” George said, “because I knew if I didn’t he was going
to hurt me real bad.” Alvin had a pocket knife on his person, but
had not displayed it before being shot.
The defense also called an expert witness: Dr. Leonard Wallace, a
Ph.D. psychiatrist on the faculty of a major university. Based on a
[thorough] psychiatric examination of George, Wallace offered his
opinion that George was suffering from “post-traumatic stress
syndrome.” “Like many victims of repeated violent beatings,” Wallace testified, “George lived in constant fear of additional attacks.”
“In my opinion, George honestly perceived that Alvin would attack him if he didn’t kill him first; that belief was quite reasonable,
203 See People v Goetz, 68 NY2d 96 (1986). See also George P. Fletcher, A Crime of SelfDefense: Bernard Goetz and the Law on Trial 1–2, 198 (Free Press 1988).
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given the muggings George had previously suffered, and the effect
204
of those muggings on his psyche,” Wallace concluded.
205

The second, based on the trial of Judy Norman, featured a wife
who, after years of severe physical abuse, shot her husband in his
sleep. She too claimed that, based on past experience, she sensed that
her husband would seriously hurt or kill her when he awoke. She also
claimed, and an expert witness avowed, that as a result of her prior
abuse she suffered from battered-spouse syndrome. Participants were
asked to read the following summary of the facts before making any
factual findings or rendering a verdict:
Julie is charged with murdering her husband, William, whom she
shot in the head as he slept.
William had persistently abused Julie during their ten-year marriage. This mistreatment included physical beatings, some of
which resulted in injuries (facial cuts; broken ribs; twice a broken
nose) requiring emergency medical treatment. Three times the
police arrested William for assaulting Julie, but released him from
custody each time after Julie declined to press charges.
Testifying in her own defense, Julie told the jury that William had
beaten her on the morning of the shooting after returning home
from a night of hard drinking and then fallen asleep in the bedroom. Julie testified that she then went to her mother’s nearby
home and obtained the hand gun used in the shooting. “I felt I
had no choice except to shoot him,” she stated, “because I knew
when he woke up this time he was going to hurt me really bad.”
The defense also called an expert witness: Dr. Leonard Wallace, a
Ph.D. psychiatrist on the faculty of a major university. Based on a
thorough psychiatric examination of Julie, Wallace offered his
opinion that Julie was suffering from “battered woman syndrome.” “Like other victims of chronic domestic violence,” Wallace testified, “Julie believed that she was powerless to leave and
that no one could or would help her.” “In my opinion, Julie honestly perceived that her husband would attack her if she didn’t
kill him first; that belief was quite reasonable, given the beatings

204

See Kahan and Braman, 45 Am Crim L Rev at 26, 65 (cited in note 34).
See State v Norman, 378 SE2d 8, 13 (NC 1989) (affirming the conviction of Judy Norman
for voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence that she “reasonably believed that
she was confronted by a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm”).
205
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she had previously suffered, and the effect of those beatings on
206
her psyche,” he concluded.
The stimuli to which participants were exposed, it should be
noted, are distinct in several ways from the stimuli in ranking studies
described in Parts I and II. The factual summaries read by respondents
in our studies were far more detailed. Participants who read these
more detailed scenarios were also provided with jury instructions
summarizing the doctrinal standard and specifying the relevant facts
they needed to find in order to convict or acquit. Participants were
then asked to answer a series of questions regarding legally relevant
facts and, once they made those findings, to render a verdict.
Thus, whereas participants in ranking studies are asked whether
they think an act described in highly simplified terms is wrong, participants in our studies were given highly detailed fact patterns and a
specific standard under which to evaluate the wrongfulness of the act
in question. Given the naturalist assertion that the “potential for exaggerating the extent of disagreement becomes greater as the crime
descriptions become more skeletal, and is at its worst when research207
ers use crime labels rather than factual descriptions,” we would expect, on the naturalist account, to find far less disagreement here than
in the ranking studies.
How did the participants react to these stimuli? To begin with,
there was significant variation across several dimensions. Blacks were
more likely to convict George than they were to convict Julie, while
whites were more likely to convict Julie than George. Similar patterns
emerged for women and men, Democrats and Republicans, liberals
and conservatives, and egalitarians and hierarchs, communitarians and
individualists. In each case, the former were more likely than the latter
to see George as more deserving of punishment than Julie. The results
are provided in Table 7 below.

206
207

Kahan and Braman, 45 Am Crim L Rev at 26, 79 (cited in note 34).
Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1860 (cited in note 13).
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TABLE 7. FREQUENCY OF GUILTY VERDICTS ACROSS RACE,
GENDER, PARTY, IDEOLOGY, AND CULTURAL ORIENTATION
N=
black : white
male : female
Republican : Democrat
liberal : conservative
egalitarian : hierarch
individualist : communitarian

George

Julie

772
56% : 29%
34% : 32%
24% : 39%
43% : 23%
44% : 23%
26% : 40%

838
41% : 48%
50% : 44%
51% : 43%
42% : 56%
42% : 51%
51% : 43%

These cross-tabulations begin to suggest what the differences
across the population are like. Every demographic group listed above
showed significant differences (at p 0.10) in determinations of guilt
with one exception: men and women did not significantly differ over
208
George’s case. These findings, of course, stand in stark contrast to the
209
ranking studies described above, which found no differences in relative seriousness.
But this kind of simple comparison is far from an ideal evaluation
of differences of opinion across the population. People are not generically black or white, male or female, Republican or Democrat, liberal
or conservative, egalitarian or individualist; these characteristics and
values tend to come in packages. How would more fleshed-out types
of people react to each of the cases?
210
Imagine two Americans. Ron, a white male who lives in Arizona, overcame his modest upbringing to become a self-made millionaire businessperson. He deeply resents government interference with
markets but is otherwise highly respectful of authority, which he believes should be clearly delineated in all spheres of life. Politically, he
identifies himself as a conservative Republican. Linda is an AfricanAmerican woman employed as a social worker in Philadelphia,

208

Kahan and Braman, 45 Am Crim L Rev at 34 table 1 (cited in note 34).
See Part I.A.
210 Yes, these are the same folks made famous in a recent and brilliant article assessing the
Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v Harris, 550 US 372, 386 (2007) (finding that a law enforcement officer acted reasonably in terminating a car chase by taking an action that caused substantial injuries to the driver). See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, and Donald Braman, Whose
Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 Harv
L Rev 837, 895–99 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s reasoning failed to connect perceptions of societal risk and contested visions of the ideal society, and invested the law with culturally partisan overtones that detract from the law’s legitimacy).
209
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Pennsylvania. She is a staunch Democrat and unembarrassed to be
characterized as a “liberal.”
Zelig, a statistical application designed by Kosuke Imai, Gary King,
211
and Olivia Lau, facilitates simulating such complex profiles, furnishing
a perfect fit for comparing responses across more detailed types of
people. It allows for reasonable statistical predictions of the perceptions
of fairly specific types of people by setting pertinent characteristics—
cultural values, gender, race, region of residence, political ideology, and
party affiliation—to appropriate values in Zelig simulations.
Individually and collectively, these analyses present a test for the
naturalist and realist perspectives. If, as naturalists assert, humans evaluate cases involving human aggression with high degrees of consistency, then we would expect similar assessments of the wrongfulness
of each act across the population. Recall that naturalists hold that
while individuals may disagree about how much to punish bad acts,
they agree on what constitutes a bad act. As such, on the whole, the
population should agree that, in each case, the defendant is either
guilty or innocent. On the other hand, if the realist position is right,
then the social meaning of the acts will move them to evaluate the
cases differently, either increasing or decreasing the likelihood of conviction or acquittal.
Relatedly, on the naturalist account, the cases should be viewed as
consistently more or less bad relative to each other. That is, the perceived
wrongfulness of acts might not be absolute across the population, but it
should be consistently ranked across the population. On the realist account, by contrast, the contingency of the social meaning of the acts
should cause egalitarians and communitarians like Linda to view
George’s shooting of strangers (with racial overtones) as worse than the
act of Julie, the battered woman shooting her husband; and it should
cause those who favor individualism and traditional social hierarchies
211 See Kosuke Imai, Gary King and Olivia Lau, Toward a Common Framework for Statistical Analysis and Development, 17 J Computational & Graph Stats 892, 894 (2008). In conventional regression analysis, the influence of some set of explanatory variables on a dependent
variable is expressed in a mathematical equation, the elements of which (regression coefficients,
standard errors, p-values, and so forth) are reported in a table. Zelig is intended to generate data
analyses that simultaneously extract more information and present it more intelligibly. Using
Zelig, an analyst specifies values for the independent variables that form a regression model. The
application then generates a predicted value for the dependent variable through a statistical
simulation that takes account of the model’s key parameters (including the standard errors for
the regression coefficients). It then repeats that process. Then it repeats it again. Then it repeats
it again and again and again—as many times as directed by the analyst (typically ten thousand
times, or enough to give a reasonable approximation of the probability distribution for the dependent variable). The resulting array of values for that dependent variable can then be analyzed
with techniques that are statistically equivalent to those used in survey sampling to determine an
average predicted value, plus a precisely calculated margin of error. See id at 895–96.
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to view Julie’s shooting of her husband as worse than George’s shooting, which they would view as a legitimate act of self-defense.
So how would these two distinct members of the American venire
evaluate these cases? As indicated in Figures 8 and 9 below, Zelig reveals the kind of demographic and values-based variation that naturalism theorists suggest does not exist.
FIGURES 8 AND 9. RON AND LINDA’S WILLINGNESS
212
TO CONVICT OR ACQUIT

Notice that it is not the case, as naturalists argue, that disagreement is generally about the “endpoints” of punishment. What we see
here are different rates of conviction and acquittal. Moreover, and even
more strikingly, we see that people with a cultural profile like Ron are
inclined to acquit George but convict Julie, whereas those with cultural profiles like Linda are inclined to do just the reverse.

212

With 95 percent confidence intervals.
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FIGURE 10. RESULTS OF TAKING FIRST DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
LINDA’S AND RON’S LIKELIHOODS OF
213
CONVICTION AND ACQUITTAL

Because it assumes a lack of diversity in the core of wrongdoing,
naturalism cannot account for the variation we see in the data. If individuals have an intuitive sense of the relative wrongfulness of acts,
then we would expect people with cultural profiles like Ron and Linda to agree—perhaps not on precisely how much punishment a person
deserves, but at the very least on the relative culpability of the two
defendants. For naturalism, dissensus in the core of wrongdoing remains a puzzle.
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
What should those who care about these issues take away from
all of this? Does either theory provide useful guidance with respect to
the practical questions that those involved in live debates over criminal law face?
A. (Anti-)Punishment Naturalism?
To begin with, it is hard to see how legal actors can draw any
normative conclusion from the naturalist literature. We have pointed
out how evidence amassed by social scientists in various disciplines
furnishes ample reason to doubt that universally shared “core intuitions of justice” dispel dissensus, across space and time, about the sorts

213

With 95 percent confidence intervals.
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of conduct that should be forbidden and punished. But however one
characterizes the extent or importance of innate apprehensions of
wrongfulness, the issue of the moral significance of such sensibilities is
an entirely different matter. Since at least Hume, it has been well
214
known that facts—about anything—do not entail moral “oughts.”
Accordingly, showing that intuitions of justice are shared does not
mean they have to be respected.
The Punishment Naturalists, consistent with their characteristic
care and thoughtfulness, of course never suggest otherwise. Their injunction that lawmakers and advocates of reform respect laws consistent with “shared intuitions” reflects a judgment about the enormous
effort that would be required to talk humans out of predispositions that
215
reflect “600 million years” of biological programming. “Evidence suggests that it takes a dramatic, concerted effort to alter fundamentally a
person’s intuitive notions of justice. Such changes in core judgments
have been notably observed in cases of coerced indoctrination, often
216
referred to as ‘brainwashing.’” This understanding of the intractability
of core judgments of punishment transforms into a conservative admonition to be wary of even trying, but only after Punishment Naturalists
take stock of the potentially disastrous consequences of failed attempts
to do so. “The criminal law can most effectively maximize its moral credibility and thereby minimize resistance and subversion by adopting
criminal rules that track shared community intuitions of justice,” Paul
217
Robinson and John Darley observe. “The danger of failing to harmonize criminal codes with intuitions of justice is that the code may lose
credibility on a wide array of prohibitions if too many are perceived to
218
be against notions of what is just.” Surely, no one would be in favor of
any reform program that can depend for its success only on the sorts of
mental reprogramming strategies used by the “Chinese military on
219
American soldiers captured during the Korean War” and that would
likely, in any case, culminate in “a generalized contempt for the system
in all its aspects, and a generalized suspicion of all of its rules” and ultimately in the emergence of “active forces of subversion and resistance”
220
within the general population.

214 See David Hume, 3 A Treatise of Human Nature 455 (Clarendon 1896) (L.A. SelbyBigge, ed) (originally published 1739–1740).
215 Jones, 87 Cal L Rev at 855 (cited in note 168).
216 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 51 (cited in note 15).
217 Id at 28.
218 Id.
219 Id at 54.
220 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 24 (cited in note 15).
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But are these admittedly terrifying prospects really the likely
outcome of efforts to use law to try to change norms on, say, “date
rape,” “drunk driving,” “drug use,” or “same-sex intercourse and . . .
221
same-sex unions” —examples that the Punishment Naturalists cite as
222
involving “criminal law manipulation” by “social engineers”? Where
is the empirical evidence of that? Indeed, where is the empirical evidence that even the much more wide-ranging reform effort that Punishment Naturalists oppose—one evincing uniform hostility to popular retributivist sensibilities generally and their replacement nonjudgmental utilitarian schemes of treatment and control—would result in
widespread social tumult?
Perhaps the most obvious clue that the conservative posture associated with Punishment Naturalism does not follow in any straightforward or obvious way from the evidence of the origins of punitive sensibilities on which it is based can be found in the work of another group
of highly accomplished scholars who draw exactly the opposite conclusions from that same evidence. We call these scholars, who include
Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, the Antipunishment Naturalists.
223
In work that Punishment Naturalists actually cite for support,
Greene and Cohen (in work to which Darley also contributed) present
evidence of the biological origins of widespread moral sensibilities. The
evidence includes fMRI studies that show that “deontological” moral
judgments, of which retributive intuitions are a conspicuous component,
originate in parts of the brain that are associated with fast-acting, unconscious, and automatic affective processes. Accordingly, they are
much more likely to influence action than are “consequentialist” or utilitarian moral judgments, which these same studies show originate in a
more slow-acting, reflective part of the brain, whose thought processes
can override those of the faster-acting, reactive part only with the exer224
tion of considerable, time-consuming effort.
Like the Punishment Naturalists, Greene and Cohen identify an
evolutionary or genetic origin for retributive and like judgments, which
221

Id at 52–53.
Id at 52.
223 See id at 58 (citing “Joshua Greene’s neuroscience studies” as support for the observation that the “core of wrongdoing seems to start with direct personal action”). But see Jonathan
McGuire, et al, A Reanalysis of the Personal/Impersonal Distinction in Moral Psychology Research, 45 J Exp Soc Psych 577 (2009) (showing that reanalysis of Greene’s data does not support
a “direct/personal” distinction); Joshua D. Greene, Dual-Process Morality and the Personal/Impersonal Distinction: A Reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie, 45 J Exp Soc
Psych 581 (2009) (acknowledging flaws in the Greene study but noting that additional studies
support a more fundamental “dual process” neural theory of moral reasoning).
224 See generally Joshua D. Greene, et al, The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment, 44 Neuron 389 (2004); Joshua D. Greene, et al, An fMRI Investigation of
Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 Sci 2105 (2001).
222
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they claim were well adapted to social conditions distinctive of the sorts
of ties and transactions that were characteristic of our remote tribal
225
past. They agree too that it is difficult, if not impossible, to “educate”
or talk people out of the punitive positions that they are impelled to by
their genetic-neurological hardwiring, in part because integral to the
same circuitry is a disposition to “confabulate”—that is, to seize on post
hoc rationalizations that occur to us after our unconscious affective sensibilities have committed us to a moral position and that stubbornly
226
resist the battering of conscious, reasoned examination.
But from this foundation—as close as it is to that of the Punishment Naturalists in various critical particulars—the Antipunishment
Naturalists derive a very different set of normative conclusions. For
them, the evolutionary origins of our widespread punitive intuitions,
far from enhancing the moral authority of retributive and like sensibilities, strips them of any pretense of being moral at all: “as an evolutionary matter of fact, we have a taste for retribution, not because
wrongdoers truly deserve to be punished regardless of the costs and
benefits, but because retributive dispositions are”—or at least were at
one point—“an efficient way of inducing behavior that allows individ227
uals living in social groups to more effectively spread their genes.”
For Greene and Cohen, the truly moral judgments are the ones that
can be defended on the basis of (nonconfabulatory) reflection on
what conduces to the best state of affairs in our current situation.
Of course, if, as the Punishment Naturalists warn, it were futile or
even self-defeating to oppose retributive sensibilities (however outmoded and insusceptible of reasoned defense they are), it would also
be foolish to try to supplant them with intuitions that reflect a consequentialist orientation. But the Antipunishment Naturalists have a
different account of how such a reform program would fare. As they
see it, the discoveries of sociobiology and neuroscience on which they
and the Punishment Naturalists both rely will themselves transform
our culture:
The net effect of this influx of scientific information will be a rejection of free will as it is ordinarily conceived, with important
ramifications for the law. As noted above, our criminal justice
system is largely retributivist. . . . [R]etributivism . . . ultimately
225 See Greene and Cohen, 359 Phil Transactions Royal Socy B: Bio Sci at 1782 (cited in
note 21); Joshua Greene, From Neural “Is” to Moral “Ought”: What Are the Moral Implications
of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?, 4 Nature Reviews Neurosci 847, 848–49 (2003).
226 See, for example, Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, in Walter SinnottArmstrong, ed, 3 Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders,
and Development 35, 60–63 (MIT 2008).
227 Id at 71.
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depends on an intuitive, libertarian notion of free will that is undermined by science. Therefore, with the rejection of commonsense conceptions of free will comes the rejection of retributivism and an ensuing shift towards a consequentialist approach to
punishment, i.e. one aimed at promoting future welfare rather
228
than meting out just deserts.
The Antipunishment Naturalists offer no empirical evidence (as opposed to conjectural storytelling) to back up this account of how a
program to abolish a retributive system of criminal law will be received. But that just means that they present no less empirical evidence than do the Punishment Naturalists in support of their grim
account of the consequences that meaningful pursuit of that vision
would entail.
If one conclusion can confidently be drawn from this disagreement, then, it is that none of the materials on which both the Punishment and the Antipunishment Naturalists rely has any obvious moral
upshot. The privilege of thinking about what to do, and the empirical
work necessary to determine whether and how it can be done, survive
naturalism of any variety.
B.

Relevant to What?

We take it, though, that Punishment Naturalists believe that the
evidence they furnish is of significant practical import to debates over
the criminal law. On their account, the most serious problem posed by
our intuitions about wrongdoing is the attempted imposition of social
norms that are at odds with human nature. As Robinson and Darley
recently argued:
[T]hese findings regarding the nature of intuitions of justice have
serious implications for a variety of criminal justice debates that
focus on substantial alterations of criminal justice systems, including the abolition of punishment, the distribution of punishment according to principles that conflict with shared intuitions of justice,
and programs to change people’s intuitions about what constitutes
229
serious wrongdoing and about how much it should be punished.
Marc Hauser is similarly worried about “policy wonks and politicians”
who attempt to develop laws that are out of step with our natural in230
tuitions. This might be generalized to something along the following

228
229
230

Greene and Cohen, 359 Phil Transactions Royal Socy B: Bio Sci at 1776 (cited in note 21).
Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 11 (cited in note 15).
Hauser, Moral Minds at xx (cited in note 26).
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lines: the state should pay close attention to widely shared intuitions
about justice; it may like them or not, but it ignores them at its peril.
Do realists object to that? No. But to the realist it is puzzling advice, for it does not address any live policy debate. What political candidate is running on a platform of “Abolish Punishment Now!”? What
legislator is attempting to implement a program punishing crimes that
most people think are very serious less harshly than those that most
people think are not very serious? Even if we were to accept the naturalist account of moral intuition, the added value of assuming that our
intuitions about punishment are natural rather than social seems negligible; it just does not address the practical problems that we face related to punishment.
But Punishment Naturalists do offer advice to people involved in
contemporary debates over the criminal law. And, from criminal
reform efforts on everything from date rape to drug use, the advice
that they have to offer is pretty discouraging. On their account, issues
that fall within the core of wrongdoing—and recall that, on their account, this comprises the vast majority of criminal acts—there will be
little chance of making a lasting impact. As Robinson and Darley put
it: “Because of the universal and intuitional nature of core judgments
231
about justice . . . these judgments cannot easily be changed.” And, for
those few wrongful acts that remain outside of the core, they offer
advice for those interested in reform. The activity in question has to be
plausibly viewed as intentionally inflicting harm on others in ways that
can be viewed as similar to some wrong within the “core” of wrongdoing, and the most effective mode of argument is to analogize to that
232
core wrong.
What could possibly be wrong with this advice? In fact, picking
reasonable targets for reform and then hammering home the message
that the targeted activity is similar to other stigmatized and punished
acts certainly seems like common sense.
But is it? The advice on offer strikes us as simply inapposite. Individuals disagree about whether a car salesman who successfully convinces his target to buy a lemon has committed fraud—at the core of
deception in exchange—or has simply displayed admirable American

231 Robinson and Darley, 81 S Cal L Rev at 53 (cited in note 15). To drive home the point of
how difficult any reform efforts (even those outside of the core of wrongdoing) will be, they
describe the failures of various indoctrination campaigns, including the immense effort required
for, and relatively short-term effects of, the brainwashing of POWs during the Korean war, the
impossibly strained conditions that produce Stockholm Syndrome, and the failure of Prohibition
to reform intuitions about alcohol consumption—and these involved efforts aimed at offenses
outside of the “core”!
232 See Kerr, The Intuition of Retribution (cited in note 23).
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233

salesmanship. The question is not whether it is analogous to fraud;
the question is whether it is fraud.
If fraud strikes you as not quite “core” enough, imagine, for example, that you were concerned with reducing acquaintance rape, including the imposition of unwanted sex on women whose verbal resistance
is ignored. The idea that such behavior is “analogous” to—or just is—
rape has been exactly what reformers have been arguing, and their opponents resisting, for decades. The argument is not about what is analogous to the core; it is about what the core is. No position that abstracts
away from the cultural dispute over the definition of rape can possibly
234
generate advice to reformers about what they should do.
Or imagine that you were concerned with reducing violence
against women. You see that women who are victims of homicide are
often killed by husbands or boyfriends who discover or suspect infidelity. The law, you come to believe, encourages this behavior by allowing those who kill an unfaithful partner to be convicted not of
murder, but of the lesser crime of manslaughter. Infidelity, the law tells
the public, is “adequate provocation” for such mitigation. Judges,
235
moreover, say that the law reflects a perfectly natural sentiment. The
advice to “argue from analogy” to agreed-upon “core” offenses is unhelpful because it simply ignores that the core is itself a site of intense
cultural dispute: there is a serious dispute about whether the act is—or
is not—murder.
Similarly, people of varying cultural outlooks disagree about
whether a woman who kills her chronically abusive husband has
committed a core crime—murder—or no crime at all, not about how
to deal with some peripheral offense “analogous to” murder. And the
236
list goes on.
C.

Some Realist Advice

Realists, like naturalists, are circumspect about the prospects for
resolving many disputes over the law, though for different reasons and
233 Analogously, individuals disagree about whether and when omitting information in an
exchange is a form of lying or no wrong at all. See Richard Craswell, Taking Information
Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 Va L Rev
565, 574–75 (2006).
234 See Kahan, 158 U Pa L Rev at 805 (cited in note 158).
235 One judge, Robert E. Cahill, famously quoted by Cynthia Lee in her book, Murder and
the Reasonable Man, lamented his duty to impose any sentence at all on a man who shot and
killed his wife after discovering her infidelity, saying “I seriously wonder how many men [on
discovering spousal infidelity] would have the strength to walk away without inflicting some
corporal punishment.” Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man 41 (NYU 2003).
236 See Kahan, 158 U Pa L Rev at 805 (cited in note 158) (discussing the problem of disagreement over the core offense in the acquaintance rape context).
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with different consequences. Realist circumspection derives not from
the view that reform within the core pits impotent cultural forces
against powerful innate intuitions, but rather from the view that
reform of most of the salient legal standards pits powerful cultural
forces against one another. The realist reasons that many debates over
the law are so fraught because they are about whose values the law
will privilege. This can lead to fierce social conflict with the status of
237
the law marking which social group has prevailed.
But even if the structure of some cultural conflicts requires the law
to choose a winner, in at least some other instances, diverse citizens are
willing to focus on shared concerns. Talk about deterrence, utility, and
social welfare often signals that parties are attempting to resolve their
238
disputes without resorting to culturally sectarian forms of argument.
This is, in essence, the basis of liberal democratic deliberation.
But even those committed to a liberal ideal of deliberation over
the law can polarize on issues along cultural lines. A growing literature
suggests that this can be explained by the phenomenon of cultural
cognition, which causes individuals to conform their factual beliefs to
their cultural priors, preventing them from reaching agreement despite their commitment to social welfare maximization or some other
239
nonsectarian ground for deliberation.
Here, we think, a little realism may be of assistance. Where parties have agreed to resolve a dispute on nonsectarian terms, but are
hampered by cultural biases that cause them to come to conflicting
conceptions of the facts, it may be possible to help parties attend to
factual data in a less biased manner. While research in this area is ongoing, understanding the nature of the conflict as cultural is crucial to
developing effective strategies for mitigating polarization of factual
beliefs along cultural lines.
D. Doing What Comes Naturally
Ironically, although Punishment Naturalism is focused on shared
intuitions about wrongfulness, taking it to heart seems likely to escalate social conflict over the criminal law. To understand why, though,
one has to understand how Punishment Naturalism leverages wellestablished psychological phenomena involved in evaluating wrongful
acts and actors.

237 See generally Dan M. Kahan and Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy,
24 Yale L & Pol Rev 147 (2006).
238 See generally Kahan, 113 Harv L Rev 413 (cited in note 11).
239 See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 Stan L Rev 115 (2007).
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240

The first phenomenon is naïve realism. Naïve realism suggests
that people are quite good at spotting bias in others, but not very good
at spotting it in themselves. (The realism part of naïve realism refers to
the ability of individuals to perceive biasing influences on other
people; the naïve part of naïve realism refers to the belief that such
biases do not obtain in the self.) As a result of this widely studied mechanism, we are likely to view other people as having biased and abnormal conceptions of the world—at least relative to ourselves. As a
result, when it comes to moral disputes, we are likely to view others
(rather than ourselves) as suffering from some form of moral bias.
The self-serving nature of naïve realism echoes another phenomenon that is one of the most famous in all of social psychology: fun241
damental attribution error. When attempting to attribute our own
acts to either some fundamental attribute or situational influence, we
tend to view our socially desirable acts as stemming from fundamental
attributes and undesirable acts as stemming from situational influences. When evaluating the acts of others, though, the reverse is true:
actors tend to attribute the undesirable acts of others to fundamental
242
attributes and desirable acts to situational influences. Thus, if we
think of our own moral acts and expressions as desirable, we will tend
to think of them as reflecting a fundamental moral character rather
than some contingent or situational valuation; and the same will be
true for our attributions of the undesirable acts—acts we perceive as
immoral—of others. In moral disputes, then, we tend to view our different behaviors as reflecting relatively fundamental attributes in both
ourselves and those with whom we disagree.
What does this have to do with Punishment Naturalism? Think,
for a moment, about the way naturalist explanations orient individuals
with respect to their disagreements with one another. Recall that naturalism posits that normally developed humans will share naturally
occurring intuitions about the vast majority of wrongful acts. And recall that because of the phenomenon of naïve realism and fundamental attribution bias, individuals are more likely to attribute such biases
to others than to themselves and to think of them as reflecting fundamental differences. Then ask yourself this: does thinking that someone

240 See Lee Ross and Andrew Ward, Implications for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding,
in Edward S. Reed, Elliot Turiel, and Terrance Brown, eds, Values and Knowledge 103, 110–11
(Lawrence Erlbaum 1996).
241 See generally Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in
the Attribution Process, in Leonard Berkowitz, ed, 10 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 173 (Academic 1977).
242 See generally Bertram F. Malle, The Actor–Observer Asymmetry in Attribution: A (Surprising) Meta-Analysis, 132 Psych Bull 895 (2006).
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who disagrees with you is innately abnormal in a fundamental moral
capacity increase or decrease the likelihood of your understanding
their concerns and working toward viable reform? As it happens, what
research has been done in this area suggests that it is quite easy to
think of outgroup members as fundamentally different from oneself,
243
and that this decreases the likelihood of cooperation.
When evaluating one another’s claims, realists caution themselves
against viewing those with whom they disagree as having an innately
or fundamentally abnormal moral instinct. This does not by any means
guarantee that they will be able to come to an agreement or effect
reform—explicit value differences have underwritten and continue to
generate serious social conflict. But it does, we hope, help guard
against the all-too-easy jump to thinking that those who disagree with
our moral intuitions do so because they suffer from some fundamental
moral abnormality. Indeed, is this not already a problem in conflict
around the world: that we come to think of the people with whom we
disagree as intrinsically less moral rather than contingently different
244
along cultural lines?
Fundamental attribution error and naïve realism can also help us
understand why it is that Punishment Naturalism, despite all of the
contrary evidence, feels so natural to so many people. These (perhaps
even universal!) cognitive mechanisms cause us to favor arguments
like Punishment Naturalism. And it is these cognitive mechanisms that
Punishment Naturalists reinforce when they argue that we should “listen more closely to the moral voice of our species” and avoid the call
of “policy wonks” who tell us that we should adjust our intuitions to fit
their reasoned arguments for improving social welfare. Our moral
intuitions, our cognitive biases persuade us, both are unbiased and
reflect a fundamentally positive aspect of our nature.

243 What research does exist in this area suggests that those who view human nature as
largely set and inflexible are also more likely to look upon outgroup members as less likely to be
cooperative, and are thus less likely to actually cooperate with them; the inverse is true for those
who view human nature to be more malleable. See generally, for example, Sheri R. Levy, Chi-yue
Chiu and Ying-yi Hong, Lay Theories and Intergroup Relations, 9 Group Processes Intergroup
Rel 5 (2006) (describing how various lay theories about human attributes and cognition affect
intergroup relations); Nick Haslam, et al, Psychological Essentialism, Implicit Theories, and Intergroup Relations, 9 Group Processes Intergroup Rel 63 (2006) (finding that the belief that human
attributes are malleable increases intergroup cooperation); Giulio Boccato, et al, The Automaticity of Infra-humanization, 37 Eur J Soc Psych 987 (2007) (finding support for the infrahumanization hypothesis that uniquely human emotions are automatically more linked in memory with the ingroup than with the outgroup).
244 See Nick Haslam, Dehumanization: An Integrative Review, 10 Personality & Soc Psych
Rev 252, 252 (2006) (noting the tendency to treat outgroup members “as animal-like” and to
represent them as “objects or automata”).
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We think Punishment Realism gets it right—that is, it furnishes a
more accurate depiction of human moral intuitions than Punishment
Naturalism—and for most people, getting it right will be enough. But
we also think it can help solve—or at least not exacerbate—collective
action problems. Realism points citizens in a productive direction, focusing attention on issues around which there is genuine dispute and
lack of coordination. It also highlights the social and cognitive mechanisms that generate that unnecessary conflict, allowing legal actors
to develop tools with which to understand the source of dissensus.
That certainly does not guarantee a quick or easy resolution, but it
does, we think, provide a reasonable start toward solving the difficult
problems involved in such disputes.
CONCLUSION
We hope that the reader has come to this point with an appreciation for the way widely shared—perhaps even universal—cognitive
mechanisms can give rise to diverse and often conflicting intuitions
about justice. Many of these mechanisms may be the products of natural selection, but their flexibility lends our intuitions tremendous
range and scope. Knowledge about our cognitive building blocks, on
this realist account, can help us understand why our intuitions about
what is just seem so natural, even when they are so clearly subject to
cultural variation.
We have the utmost respect for Punishment Naturalism, which
we recognize as embodying a rich and growing stock of insights informed by highly rigorous and sophisticated methods. There is a growing trend toward the integration of empirical insights from a variety of
disciplines into legal scholarship. The originality of argument and the
scope of the research that characterize Punishment Naturalism are a
testament to the value of this trend.
We do feel deep concern, however, over what we take to be the
politically conservative resonances with which the Punishment Naturalist has been needlessly infused. It is, simply put, extremely difficult
to take in the corpus of work that the Punishment Naturalists have
amassed without sensing a deep commitment on their part to the status quo—to popular retributive sensibilities as they are (or are depicted with a high degree of uniformity to be), and to laws that conform (or are depicted as conforming) to them. Popular understandings
of wrongfulness, we are repeatedly told, are “deep, predictable, and
245
widely shared.” They are the product of inexorable biological

245

Robinson and Kurzban, 91 Minn L Rev at 1892 (cited in note 13).
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forces—“an evolved predisposition” combined with “social learning”
of the sort that “arise[s] only from . . . human life experience[s] so fun246
damental as to be essentially universal to all persons.” As such, it is
247
naïve to expect “arguments or education” to change them; something much more fundamental, and much more odious, would be necessary “to fundamentally alter . . . intuitive notions of justice,” something akin to the “coercive indoctrination” that is characteristic of totalitarian states and that would never “be tolerated in a modern liber248
al democracy.” Less extreme “social engineering programs aimed at
249
changing” norms through laws are not only likely to fail, but also to
blow up in the engineers’, and everyone else’s, faces: “when the criminal justice system is seen as out of tune with community sentiments,”
the law suffers a “loss of moral credibility” that can grow into “a generalized contempt for the system in all its aspects, [ ] a generalized
suspicion of all of its rules,” and ultimately the destruction of its “rel250
evance as a guide to good conduct.”
It is possible that the Punishment Naturalists mean to direct their
cautionary, “hands off” admonition only to academic theorists who
call for replacing “punishment” informed by retributive sensibilities of
any sort with a humanistic—or perhaps simply technocratic—
251
utilitarian regime animated by goals of incapacitation and therapy.
As we have pointed out, the most intriguing theoretical architects of
such a system build their regime on the same psychobiological foundation on which the Punishment Naturalists rest their own populist
252
retributivism. But the generality with which the Punishment Naturalists couch the lessons they draw from their work, and the nature of the
concrete examples they give of “recent reform programs” that embo253
dy “criminal law manipulation . . . by social engineers” —programs
aimed at reforming rape law, at reducing smoking, at increasing punishment of domestic violence, at discouraging recreational drug use, at
focusing attention on drunk driving, at combating workplace sexual
harassment, and at “build[ing] public acceptance of both same-sex

246

Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones, 60 Vand L Rev at 1646, 1687 (cited in note 14).
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intercourse . . . and same-sex unions” —invite readers (who have in255
deed accepted the invitation ) to see their resistance to using law to
change norms as having much broader normative significance.
Our goal has been to show that Punishment Naturalism does not
supply a basis for any particular position on any live and disputed issue in the criminal law informed by clashing cultural values. We conclude with a statement of three interrelated propositions that we think
survive close engagement with Punishment Naturalism and that defeat any attempt to derive a generic, conservative suspicion to norm
reform from it.
First, as a matter of politically consequential fact, intuitions of justice are characterized by immense cultural heterogeneity. It might be
the case that, for the most part, human beings everywhere and at all
times have been opposed to murder, rape, and misappropriation. But
over space and over time, what counts as murder, rape, and misappropriation have varied tremendously. The reason is that cultural norms
define key elements of those wrongs—who counts as a person, for
example, what sorts of behavior interfere with a person’s vital interests, what kinds of behavior surrender rightful control of one’s body,
what sorts of personal and communal claims constrain individual entitlements to property, and the like. Opposing understandings like
these persist across identifiable cultural groups in contemporary
American society. They are what animate debates about rape reform,
gradations of homicide, abortion, the scope of antifraud provisions,
and myriad other issues.
Second, intuitions of justice are plastic. By this we mean that such
understandings do in fact change in one place over time. Often change
is slow and gradual; but sometimes it is quite sudden and dramatic.
Third, intuitions of justice and law are endogenous. This is the
simple point that understandings of wrongdoing and law are reciprocally related: what is considered “wrongful” influences law, and what
the law prohibits influences understandings of what is wrongful, and
also how wrongful it is. Accordingly, law reform often can be a catalyst
for norm change—indeed, for norm change that itself feeds back on
law and thus back on itself. Examples of such interplay are legion, including the prominent example of homicide law in the United States,
where the changing factual circumstances that the law (formally
through doctrine, and practically through jury verdicts) recognizes as
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full or partial defenses show how highly interactive culture, law, and
256
intuitions relating to core wrongdoing can be.
We want to close with an admission and some appreciation. It is
quite possible that we are wrong. The beauty of the best naturalist
work—and here we are thinking of the work of those we have criticized
above—is that it makes clear claims based on readily discernible data.
We think that the naturalists have missed data and that their claims are
too broad, but they have moved the ball forward significantly by articulating claims that previously had been made without data and which
were thus nearly impossible to engage on the merits. And perhaps we
are too critical. Perhaps we are succumbing to cognitive biases that
cause us to favor evidence supporting our own parochial perspective.
Perhaps. Happily, if you think that, you are already a realist.
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APPENDIX
Items from the ranking studies conducted by Robinson and
257
Kurzban.
The following four scenarios were typically assigned no punishment and were thus unranked.
DEFENDING ATTACK. John is knocked down from behind by a man
with a knife who moves to stab him. As the man lunges for him, John
stabs him with a piece of glass he finds on the ground, which is the
only thing he can do to save himself from being killed. The man later
dies of his injuries.
COERCIVE THREAT TO CHILD. A man grabs John’s child and puts a
sharp knife to her throat. He tells John that he will kill the child if
John does not steal an expensive digital camera from a nearby shop or
he attempts to contact police. Because the man can see everything he
does, John does as he is told in order to save his child.
UMBRELLA MISTAKE. John takes another person’s umbrella assuming it to be his own because it is has the same unusual color pattern as
his own, a fact that the police confirm.
HALLUCINATION. Another person slips a drug into John’s food, which
causes him to hallucinate that he is being attacked by a wolf. When John
strikes out in defense, he does not realize that he is in fact striking a
person, a fact confirmed by all of the psychiatrists appointed by the
state, who confirm that John had no ability to prevent the hallucination.
The following twenty-four were typically ranked as increasingly
serious offenses and as deserving increasing quanta of punishment.
WHOLE PIES FROM BUFFET. The owner has posted rules at his allyou-can-eat buffet that expressly prohibit taking food away; patrons
can only take what they eat at the buffet. The owner has set the price
of the buffet accordingly. John purchases dinner at the buffet, but
when he leaves he takes with him two whole pies to give to a friend.
LOGO T-SHIRT FROM STORE. John notices in a small family-owned
music store a T-shirt with the logo of his favorite band. While the store
clerk is preoccupied with inventory, John places the $15 T-shirt in his
coat and walks out, with no intention of paying for it.
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SHORT CHANGE CHEAT. John is a cab driver who picks up a high
school student. Because the customer seems confused about the money transaction, John decides he can trick her and gives her $20 less
change than he knows she is owed.
CLOCK RADIO FROM CAR. As he is walking to a party in a friend’s
neighborhood, John sees a clock radio on the backseat of a car parked
on the street. Later that night, on his return from the party, he checks
the car and finds it unlocked, so he takes the clock radio from the
back seat.
ELECTRIC DRILL FROM GARAGE. John does not have all the tools he
needs for his workshop but knows of a family two streets over who
sometimes leave unlocked the door to the detached garage next to
their house. When he next sees his chance, he enters the detached garage through the unlocked door and takes a medium-sized electric
drill, intending to keep it forever.
MICROWAVE FROM HOUSE. While a family is on vacation, John jimmies the back door to their house and steps into their kitchen. On the
counter, he sees their microwave, which he carries away.
SMASHING TV. While a family is away for the day, John breaks in
through a bedroom widow and rummages through the house looking
for valuables. He can only find an eighteen-inch television, which angers
him. When he gets it outside, he realizes that it is an older model than
he wants, so he smashes it onto the driveway, breaking it into pieces.
SLAP & BRUISING AT RECORD STORE. A record store patron is wearing a cap that mocks John’s favorite band. John follows him from the
store, confronts him, then slaps him in the face hard, causing him to
stumble. The man’s face develops a harsh black and yellow bruise that
does not go away for some time.
HEAD-BUTT AT STADIUM. While attending a football game, John becomes angry as he overhears an opposing fan’s disparaging remarks
about John’s team. At the end of the game, John sticks his face in the
man’s face and head-butts him, causing a black eye and a gash that
requires two stitches to close.
STITCHES AFTER SOCCER GAME. Angry after overhearing another
parent’s remarks during a soccer match in which John’s son is playing,
John approaches the man after the game, grabs his coffee mug, knocks
him down, then kicks him several times while he is on the ground,
knocking him out for several minutes and causing cuts that require
five stitches.
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NECKLACE SNATCH AT MALL. As a woman searches her purse for car
keys in a mall parking lot, John runs up and grabs her gold necklace
but it does not break. He yanks the woman to the ground by her necklace, where she gashes her head, requiring stitches. John runs off without the necklace.
ATTEMPTED ROBBERY AT GAS STATION. John demands money from
a man buying gas at a gas station. When the man refuses, John
punches the man several times in the face, breaking his jaw and causing several cuts that each require stitches. He then runs off without
getting any money.
CLUBBING DURING ROBBERY. To force a man to give up his wallet
during a robbery attempt, John beats the man with a club until he relinquishes his wallet, which contains $350. The man must be hospitalized for two days.
MAULING BY PIT BULLS. Two vicious pit bulls that John keeps for illegal dog fighting have just learned to escape and have attacked a person who came to John’s house. The police tell John he must destroy the
dogs, which he agrees to do but does not intend to do. The next day, the
dogs escape again and maul to death a man delivering a package.
INFANT DEATH IN CAR. John is driving to see a man about buying an
illegal gun but must baby-sit his friend’s toddler son. It occurs to him
that it is too hot to safely leave the toddler in the car but he decides to
leave him anyway and to return soon. He gets talking with the seller,
however, and forgets about the toddler, who passes out and dies.
STABBING. John is offended by a woman’s mocking remark and decides to hurt her badly. At work the next day, when no one else is
around, he picks up a letter opener from his desk and stabs her. She
later dies from the wound.
AMBUSH SHOOTING. John knows the address of a woman who has
highly offended him. As he had planned the day before, he waits there
for the woman to return from work and, when she appears, John
shoots her to death.
ABDUCTION SHOOTING. A woman at work reveals John’s misdeeds
to his employer, thereby getting him fired. John devises a plan to get
even with her. The next week he forces the woman into his car at knife
point and drives her to a secluded area where he shoots her to death.
BURNING MOTHER FOR INHERITANCE. John works out a plan to kill
his sixty-year-old invalid mother for the inheritance. He drags [her] to
her bed, puts her in, and lights her oxygen mask with a cigarette, hoping
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to make it look like an accident. The elderly woman screams as her
clothes catch fire and she burns to death. John just watches her burn.
RANSOM, RAPE, TORTURE & STRANGLING. John kidnaps an eightyear-old girl for ransom, rapes her, then records the child’s screams as
he burns her with a cigarette lighter, sending the recording to her parents to induce them to pay his ransom demand. Even though they pay
as directed, John strangles the child to death to avoid leaving a witness.

